Students, Faculty of Tarbiyah and Teaching Sciences of Maulana .. materi dan mengembangkan kemampuan mahasiswa. strategi yang. Download Materi Tarbiyah Muayyid apk for Android. materi tarbiyah irwan prayitno, materi tarbiyah pemula ppt, materi tarbiyah pemula pdf, materi tarbiyah . PDF | In the early 20th century, Islamic scholars in Minangkabau are divided into two groups: is an effort to teach the material with aspects of Islam, or Islamic.
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Graham Masterton Pdf, pdf viewer download chip, terence mckenna food gods pdf download, download materi soundofheaven.info, can t download pdf. Page 1. التربية الذاتية. TARBIYAH. DZATIYA. باللغة الإندونيسية. Page 2. Page 3. Page 4. Page 5. Page 6. Page 7. Page 8. Page 9. Page Page Materi Tarbiyah: 'Urgensi Syahadat' (PDF + DOC + PPT) Ajaran Islam adalah ajaran yang lengkap. Ia menyentuh semua segi kehidupan d.
The traditions or reports of the sayings of the Prophet hajj Ar. Orang kedua yang ia temui adalah ibunya dan disampaikan kalimat dakwah. Majelis Syuro bertugas menyusun Visi dan Missi Partai, ketetapan- ketetapan dan rekomendasi Musyawarah Nasional, dan memilih Pimpinan Pusat Partai serta keputusan-keputusan strategis lainnya. Dua syahadat itu terdiri dari syahadat tauhid dan syahadat risalah. Under such circumstances, the political system is not fully open or the political openness has not been institutionalised. A party often associated with NU.
Dan sesungguhnya sebelum kedatangan Nabi itu, mereka adalah benar-benar dalam kesesatan yang nyata. Shalawat dan salam semoga selalu diberikan kepada Rasulullah Muham-mad.
Beliau dengan segala pengorbanan dan tanggung jawabnya menunaikan tugas dan menyampaikan amanah dengan sempurna, telah mendidik kita ke jalan yang lurus. Doa dan salam semoga pula senantiasa terlimpah kepada keluarga, shahabat, dan para pengikutnya yang setia hingga akhir zaman.
Kiiriknlum Tarbiyah tclah dijadikan panduan yang mengarahkan tarbiyah mereka pada jalan yang lempang dalam memahami dan mengimplementasikan Islam dalam kehidupan. Karena itu, beberapa upaya telah dilakukan untuk menjabarkan atau men-. Maka muncullah buku-buku tarbiyah yang merujuk kepadanya.
It had and still has strong connections with the Islamic World League Rabithat al- Alam al-Islami , the worldwide Islamic organisation that was funded by the Saudi Kingdom, and to which Natsir was appointed Vice-Chairmen. Not surprisingly, they were influenced by the teachings and methods of the Brotherhood. Rahman Zainuddin, the writings of top leading figures of the Brotherhood such as Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb and the like, had been translated into Indonesian thereby making it possible for campus dakwah activists to access these writings in their own native language.
Many of these students possessed religious and spiritual inquiries. Not surprisingly, campus mosques became the centre of dakwah activities, and were attended by many students who wanted to participate in religious circles halaqah. Also, the influence of Islamic revivalism was evident in increasing prevalence of Islamic attire e. Campus dakwah then metamorphosed into a legalised unit of student activity, that is, it became the Campus Predication Institute LDK.
LDK benefited from being an officially recognised student organisation in two ways. First, it received financial support, in the same way as other registered student organisations, from the campus administrator. This yearly financial assistance was useful for the sustainability of the organisation and was helpful for supporting massive and 24 Halaqah is an Islamic gathering or forum to discuss religious issues.
Second, in the context of suppression of student activism, through establishing itself as a legal student organisation, LDK sent a clear message to the regime that it did not oppose the status quo. It emphasised to the state that its main activity was the cultivation of religious understanding and practice. Since FSI developed rapidly and won wide support among students, the establishment of a well-organised forum for managing a broad range of Islamic activities such as LDK was very important.
LDK soon began to build broader contacts with various bodies of dakwah movements on other university campuses. HT is an Islamist transnational movement which strongly rejects the notions of democracy and nation-state, and whose primary objective is to rebuild a global Islamic caliphate.
Mama Abdullah bin Nuh. In fact, as noted earlier, campus dakwah sought to avoid direct confrontation with the regime by staying away from politics and focusing its activities on cultivating religious understanding and practice among students.
Given that the association of usrah with radical organisations could harm campus dakwah, its leaders began to call their movement halaqah, which refers to an informal religious circle of students and their teachers.
The DI rebellion began in and yet the army crushed it in the s.
However, there were a few units in West Java which succeeded in reviving the movement. They utilized the Brotherhood-style cell structure usrah to recruit members.
For a detailed account of Darul Islam, see C. See also, Damanik, Fenomena, In the wake of deepening social political unrest in the latter period of Suharto, KAMMI emerged as one of the most conspicuous student movements voicing public grievances through massive rallies throughout the country and pressuring for regime change. As explained earlier, campus dakwah had previously maintained its strategy of distancing itself from political confrontation with the state; believing that the path of dakwah would have a long-term impact.
This initiative was also supported by some campus dakwah activists who argued that the already established networks and resources of the dakwah movement should be transformed into a political party. They believed in the benefits of participating in the newly democratic system.
However, some activists opposed the idea and proposed to turn the movement into a non-political organisation ormas. An internal survey involving core cadres of the movement resulted in the majority of activists agreeing to establish a party. They acknowledge, however, that the two 42 Ibid. Most alumni of KAMMI hold key positions of leadership in the party structure, either in the central board or in local branches. The first priority for the leadership of PK was how to transfer the ideological loyalties of the campus dakwah movement to the party.
The reformulation of the relationship between the party and movement is pivotal to the long-term success of the party. As is widely known, the Egyptian Muslim organisation faced harsh punishment from the regime. Thesis presented at Ohio University, Ironically, this party appeared to exclude a mass following, which, it is deemed by PK leaders, do not understand Islamic principles.
This 46 Ibid. See also, Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia, In the parliamentary elections, PKS succeeded in gaining 7. This remarkable success of PKS was in part due to the fact that the party adopted so-called a two-track—simultaneously Islamist and non-Islamist— electoral strategy. Having sketched the transformation of PKS from a student movement to political party, I will emphasise the position of the party as an Islamist movement.
Before discussing PKS as an Islamist movement, one must define what Islamism and social movements are. Islamism is the extent to which Islam is perceived as a set of specific norms, comprehensive and superiority of Islam and, therefore, it contains the blueprint of a social order.
This may be carried out peacefully or through violent actions that are determined by the value system of the actors. Above all, however, PKS can best be understood as moderate Islamism instead of radical jihadist Islamism. Also, it describes itself as a peaceful movement that rules out the use of violence in achieving its goals. In attempting to delineate the position of PKS among various Islamic organisations in Indonesia, the former president of PKS, Hidayat Nurwahid, describes the party as a centrist Islamic party which occupies the middle ground between radical Islamist groups that reject democracy and Muslim organisations committed to democracy.
The characteristic actors are the fighters al-mujahid. Between Movement and Party In this part, I will look at PKS as a political party, which presents itself as a force of collective action by functioning as a social movement organisation. In the s and the mids, social psychology dominated scholarship on movements, focusing extensively on the collective behaviour approach which saw social movements as long-lasting panics and crowds.
It has been claimed that collective behavior is relatively characterised by its non- institutional and spontaneous activity, but the biggest difference between social movements and the other forms of collective behaviour concerns the duration of the social movement, that its more long-lasting than collective behaviour. See, Gary T. McCarthy and Mayer N. I will treat PKS as a social movement. As noted by Goldstone, political parties and social movements in the U.
Goldstone ed. UK, As will be further explained, there are a significant number of external factors or political opportunities that gave rise to PKS. By using the perspective of resource mobilisation, PKS is able to generate the involvement of its sympathisers and to transform it into activism and long-time commitment.
More importantly, PKS takes on an organisational framework. In social movement theory, this is a large specialty area known as resource mobilisation. This emphasises the importance of ideas in conjunction with organisational and political opportunity factors. In short, PKS takes the form of a movement for a number of reasons. First, PKS has not only articulated its political agenda within institutionalised politics, but has also translated its grievances and interests through a range of collective actions which involve large numbers of its sympathisers.
No other party has such a high degree of engagement with extra-parliamentary activity. An investigation of 61 Jack A. Snow, E. It can be said that elements of social movement organisations i. Second, PKS is a political party which comes out of the Tarbiyah, a religious movement. As explained earlier, PKS utilised the already established networks and resources of Tarbiyah to advance its political agenda. In other words, there is no distinction between PKS and Tarbiyah. Like Tarbiyah on which it is based, PKS is a cadre party.
Members must have passed through a series of six levels ending with takhassus, holders of special expertise in dakwah. Illustration 1 Caption: Available at zioneocon. This chapter relies primarily on protest event analysis, which is frequently used in social movement research. Nonetheless, some excerpts from my interviews with several prominent leaders of PKS will be presented as well to support the findings of this protest event analysis.
Given that the notion of social movement and that of collective action are inexorably intertwined, we must adequately define what collective action is. As described earlier, one of the most salient characteristics of social movements is the element of collective action.
McAdam and Snow argue that social movements are a form of collective action. In this sense, collective action relies on unconventional forms of political participation as opposed to the conventional ones.
According to Kaase and Marsh, conventional participation is any activity by ordinary people, not elites, to influence political outcomes according to relatively settled procedures or laws such as voting, campaigning, etc. Barnes and Max Kaase eds. Usually at the time of its anniversary, the party mobilises its sympathisers into the streets or conducts great meetings or public sermons addressing various issues on international Islamism.
The way the party is striving in parliament, in elections either at the national or local levels and at the negotiating table cannot be seen as forms of collective actions. For instance, media 8 Students of social movement have been varied in their interpretations of the meaning of collective in collective events.
Charles Tilly proposed a minimum of 50 people. Olzak and West use at least 2 people, but most observers choose a minimum in the range of 10 and Burstein, Discrimination, Jobs and Politics: This is largely because those activities or repots are primarily concerned with the scope of elite rather than spontaneous grass-root mobilisation. Apart from using newspaper data for conducting protest event analysis, I also use them along with other primary sources for political discourse analysis as will further developed in the chapter 4 and 5.
An International Quarterly, Vol. As is widely known, PKS has continuously built its reputation on being a so-called cadre party partai kader which actively engages its constituencies on a continual basis, with a remarkable record of social work and dealing with non-political issues such as running a number of educational institutions both formal Sistem Terpadu or non-formal, and so on.
PKS also manages such religious activities as liqo weekly meeting , mabit spending the night at the mosque , daurah training program , rihlah travel program and the like in regular ways.
These routine activities cannot be seen as forms of collective action. Olzak even excludes anniversary marches and annual celebrations since their timing is predetermined and not spontaneous.
First of all, newspaper content is not intended or created for academic purposes so that the reliability and validity of the data might be questioned. Also, some critics argue that the protest event method that relies heavily on newspaper data suffers from selection bias because a news desk has a number of limitations such as space restriction to report on all events that actually occur.
Likewise the newspaper data cannot be immune from impressions and inferences of journalists or commentators or actors thereby making such data more vulnerable to description bias. David G. Ortiz, Daniel J. Myers, N. Eugene Walls, and Maria-Elena D. An International Journal, 10 3: McCarthy, and Sarah A. Given that the two print media have their own official websites, I also took advantage of their electronic archives by using keyword search strings.
Among the collective events carried out by PKS captured in this work, Clearly, by using more than two sources of newspaper data, this study captured more PKS collective events and is thus able to assess differences in reporting on the same events that are covered by more than one newspaper. The first is when the action takes place. As will further be explained, the openness and repressiveness of political systems are influential in determining the emergence of movements.
The second is types of actions. This is to define the extent to which PKS conducts its collective actions out in peaceful, disruptive or violent ways. Olzak defines events as violent if weapons or attacks are used to threaten or damage persons physically or objects.
A violent event has been defined in terms of the number of deaths during collective actions E. It evolved out of an informally Islamist- 23 Tarrow, Power in Movement, The relatively little activity carried out by FSLDK is an unsurprising finding considering the fact that it is merely a friendship forum for building networks to facilitate intercampus predication.
PK merged into PKS in following its failure to generate sufficient votes in It comes as no surprise that PKS draws more attention from news agencies than other forms of Tarbiyah. Its remarkable success in the elections is a crucial reason why many people, including media, are looking at PKS more closely. Only 6. As is widely known, KAMMI, as one of the most influential student forces, played key role in demanding total reform actions which subsequently led Suharto to step down in Above all, however, the grand-scale demonstrations pressuring the government for change before 21 of May , including those under the banner of KAMMI, were made possible by the declining capacity of Suharto to sideline any challenges.
The Graph 1 shows that prior to Tarbiyah did not appear publicly in order to avoid sustained political repression. Tarbiyah then focused its activities on cultivating religious understanding and practices in campus mosques.
This finding affirms the theory of political opportunities where it is stated that the more the political system is opened, the more opportunities are available for the emergence of collective action. In contrast, the more the political system is closed, the less opportunity there is for collective action. If the party organizes such an Islamist-based action at election times, it would damage the image of the party. In for instance, there were a number of controversies which PKS reacted to: Graph 2 Another favourite type of action is a call, appeal or demand 6.
As reported by media, hundreds of PKS cadres from Kediri in East Java were ready to leave for Lebanon to help Hizbullah troops in their struggle against the Israeli invasion in But, to my knowledge, no one was sent to the Middle East.
Nonetheless, there was no clarity whether the volunteers were sent or not. Another form of PKS actions that is rarely seen in public is flag burning 2. For instance, in response to the Israeli full-scale offensive against Lebanon, local branches of student organisations in Ambon, including KAMMI and LDK, organised thousands of people to march through the main streets of the city while waving Palestinian flags, chanting anti-America and Israeli slogans and burning Israeli flags.
Main Issues Criticism of Western domination of the global political order, epitomized by U. Specifically, along with the rise of anti-America sentiment that has been a dominant issue in PKS protests Not surprisingly, anti-Israeli sentiment has become the most salient characteristic of PKS demonstrations, with almost one third This figure makes PKS different from other Islamic parties and Islamic- based mass organisations such as the largest traditionalist Muslim organisation Nahdhatul Ulama NU and the Muslim modernist-based organisation Muhammadiyah.
No other Islamic party has such an attachment to the Palestine cause as well as such an enduring criticism of America as does PKS. In PKS we find relatively high levels of participation in various types of actions against America and Israel. In other words, PKS supporters have more successfully transformed their anti-America and Israeli sentiment into actions relative to their fellow Muslims who affiliate with other Islamic parties or with Muslim organisations like NU and Muhammadiyah.
Since its inception, KAMMI successfully mobilised massive rallies and great meetings tabligh akbar against Suharto in many public universities in Indonesia. As the most disciplined political force in Indonesia, PKS also exerts its capability to send hundreds of its tight-knit cadres to offer support in natural disaster zones 5.
PKS also paid significant attention to the anti-pornography movement 5. In fact, PKS collective actions are generally event-based.
One event may come and go, but the prevalence of PKS actions against Israel can emerge across time and location. The Palestine question keeps occupying the minds of PKS supporters as reflected in its everlasting large- scale demonstrations protesting Israeli actions against Palestinians. The data shows that PKS uses domestic events to bring attention to international issues, such as demanding that the government takes a firm line against Israel and give stronger support to the Palestinian struggle.
Also, during the political turmoil of , PK and KAMMI also actively mobilised its supporters to demand the downfall of President Wahid for his alleged involvement in a corruption scandal along with their opposition against his plan to open an economic relationship with Israel 3.
For some people, turning greater attention to geographically distant issues like Palestine and Israel as the nation is still struggling with a number of economic, political and social issues e. Nonetheless, the data shows again that PKS has paid greater attention to any international events which relate to anti-Israel and America sentiments. Similar processions wound their way simultaneously through other big and small cities across the country, such as Surabaya, Makassar, Kediri, Gresik, and so on.
This is hardly found in other Islamic parties.
Unlike PKS, many Islamic parties are rarely seen to mobilise their supporters to go the streets. If they do so, they will usually raise issues of more domestic relevance such as demanding the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter into the preamble of the constitution.
Further, it is plausible to say that PKS are capable of increasing the likelihood of coverage in the media. Some of its protests against Israel are not event-based, yet receive greater coverage from news gatherers.
For example, the fiftieth commemoration of the Israeli occupation of Palestine received massive media coverage, even though the public previously deemed this issue unimportant, distasteful and not of interest to news readership. For example, actions as a response to the Israeli air strike against Palestinians the U. Islamist and Non-Islamist Category This study will also distinguish the aforementioned issues based on Islamist and non-Islamist categories. Meanwhile, transnational Islamism refers to a form of Islamic solidarity that transcends geographical boundaries by taking advantage of the concept of umma as shown in PKS enduring actions against Israel and America.
On the other hand, PKS events on anti-corruption, the reformasi struggle, anti-money politics and the like are classified as non-Islamist issues. For a more detailed account of definition of Islamism, see Chapter 1 c. However, the finding has told us something significant about PKS. Through its collective actions, PKS has presented itself as being amongst the best organised Islamist force raising geographically distant issues that correspond with the increasingly anti-America and Israeli sentiment along with issues relatively closer to home, which are still Islamist in essence e.
This does not necessarily mean that PKS are only concerned about what is happening globally. The data shows that PKS is also concerned about what is happening in its home country. Indeed PKS describes itself as Sunni. Interestingly, the data reveals that the majority of PKS events were anchored in geographically distant enemies focusing on transnational Islamist issues rather than on relatively nearer enemies and the national interest. Hidayat Nurwahid, former president of the party, admitted that the relatively distant enemies notably pro-Palestine have been a dominant trend in PKS demonstrations.
The easiest way to show our opposition to Israel is grand-scale demonstrations, by which our disapproval towards Israel can be reported by Western news agencies. PKS does not need to organise massive rallies that raise domestic issues because we have already articulated them through a number of PKS representatives in the legislature.
In terms of PKS demonstrations, our target audience is, in fact, Westerners. Graph 5 60 Other cities 43 Untung Wahono, Interview, 4 October Pontianak, Palembang, Denpasar, and Pangkal Pinang share the same level 1. Graph 6 Places First, Jakarta is the capital of Indonesia, where Republika, Kompas as the primary sources of this study along with many news agencies are situated.
Media sources are less likely to attend and report events that are far away because of the lack of journalists and it is more costly to cover the events. Second, as the centre of political and economic activities and the place where all foreign embassies are located, Jakarta provides target specific locales.
More importantly, Jakarta is a PKS stronghold, where the party won convincingly in the elections and thus collective events are more likely to occur in Jakarta. Surprisingly, 7. Even more so, there were thousands of people gathered in 5. But there were just 5.
PKS actions that occur in Jakarta involve grand-scale demonstrations and most are related to the virulent strain of anti-Zionist and American sentiments. Finally, the measurement, which is based on the involvement of significant actors or leaders in an event, is politically and culturally significant.
Hence, those events are more likely to be reported. Media preference also goes to Tifatul Sembiring, which serves currently as the president of the party Other leaders are reported at about the same level, on average no more than 1.
Graph 7 Action Leaders 35 Illustration 3 Caption: Available at newscompass. In this chapter, I will discuss theories of political opportunity structures and examine the double track of political opportunity structures; the international contexts and domestic possibilities for political opportunities that facilitated or constrained the emergence of PKS. Political Opportunity Structures POS Since its emergence in the late s, the concept of political opportunity structures POS has become popular among social and political scientists and has spurred much research in the field of social movements.
Various scholars have pointed out the different dimensions of POS. Tarrow defines political opportunity structures as: According to McAdam, the openness and the closure of political systems are amongst the most salient factors of POS, which is influential in determining the movement emergence. Comparative Perspectives, p.
Under such circumstances, the political system is not fully open or the political openness has not been institutionalised.
Nonetheless, the capacity of the regime to suppress the movement has declined significantly, thereby opening new opportunities for collective action. In short, social movements do not occur in a vacuum. Instead, they rely heavily on external conditions that provide opportunities for collective action.
As a social movement, PKS is not a spontaneous gathering because before it emerged in public there is a series of socio-political processes which overtime contributed to its development. The international context of political opportunities helped to structure the domestic possibilities for the development of PKS. In this regard, alongside the domestic factors outlined above, the following international dimensions help to explain the emergence of Tarbiyah and its current political wing, PKS.
The first international impetus for Islamic revivalism in Indonesia that facilitated the emergence of Tarbiyah is the triumph of the Islamist revolution in Iran. As was suggested by many scholars, the revival of Islam was perceived as a popular assertion of Muslim identity against Western political and cultural dominance.
As a result of the Iranian revolution, revivalists in many Muslim countries felt that it was now possible for Islamic forces to overthrow Western-supported regimes —such as that of the Shah which adopted a secular autocratic state— and they were inspired to do so in their own countries. Another international factor that helped the emergence of the Tarbiyah was the strengthening of links between the modernist-Islamist groups DDII and Saudi Arabia.
As noted in the previous chapter, DDII played a vital role in establishing the campus dakwah movement. Having said that the Iranian revolution was proudly welcomed in many predominantly Muslim countries, including Indonesia, Saudi Arabia sought to spread its political and religious influence across the Muslim world in order to counter the increasing dominance of Iran. First of all, we think that the Iranian revolution was the triumph of Islam. Among other things, in the s DDII sent a number of students to undertake Islamic studies in Saudi Arabia with scholarships provided by the kingdom.
At this time, Islamic activism and enthusiasm, called al-Sahwa al-Islamiyyah Islamic awakening , gripped Saudi universities. The Brotherhood activists played a key role in filling the gap, especially in education where they designed educational systems and curriculum at schools and universities in the country.
Who are the Islamists? Its lecturers in the s and s were mostly inspired by the Brotherhood thinking and the majority of books in the library were written by members of the Brotherhood.
HMI helped their Malaysian counterparts to organize several dakwah training trips to Jakarta and Bandung.
Dakwah among the Students, Pelanduk Publications, Malaysia, p. It is worth pointing out that in spite of bringing those translating books to Indonesia, Imaduddin had a very important role in influencing Malaysian students toward the totality of Islam.
Zainah wrote that Imaduddin developed selected groups of Islamic students in Malaysia and began to conduct religious circles. See, Anwar, Islamic Revivalism, pp. Agus Salim and Dr. To begin with, I will discuss two domestic factors that directly enhanced the emergence of Tarbiyah: I will also point 24 Hidayat Nurwahid, Interview, 4 October These domestic factors will be discussed in the following contexts: The first notable domestic factor that led to the emergence of campus dakwah was the proscription of explicit Islamic political expressions.
Clear evidence of this can be found in a number of political maneuvers, including: In addition to this, Suharto had repeatedly proven his capacity to suppress dissident voices. Hundreds of protesters led by Amir Biki were shot at by the military as they demonstrated against military personnel who tore down brochures advocating that Muslim women should wear Islamic 26 Asiaweek, July 5, Long suppressed under authoritarian rule, a few Islamic activists became more radicalised and went underground.
In the early s, student protests intensified. Kakuei Tanaka in Jakarta. In , large-scale student unrest emerged, including at the Bandung Institute of Technology ITB that led the military to occupy campuses. Several student leaders were arrested and put in jail. The extensive use of administrative and coercive powers prevented critical Islamic groups as well as Islamic students from engaging in explicit political activism.
As a reaction to such a hostile environment, some of them undertook to 28 Ibid. In terms of resource mobilisation, which draws primarily upon rational choice theory, coercive force and repression raise the costs and risks of participation and consequently depress collective action.
Hence, the presence of campus dakwah can best be understood as a rejection of the regime. Overall, these were all strategic choices of actions as a result of the harsh realities of repression under the New Order.
While the first two domestic factors are related to external political pressures imposed by the Suharto regime, the following domestic changes are primarily concerned with the growing interest in Islamic studies and practices. Indeed the trend of Islamic revivalism among students in the early s was also related to events and socio-political changes in the world-wide Muslim community. The sources of these phenomena did, however, have local impetus. First of all, the phenomenon of the Islamic turn in Indonesia was fueled by rapid economic development under Suharto.
The real gross domestic product had expanded by over percent compared to the previous regime. Terrence H. Hull and Gavin W. William Skinner, ed. In a further development, the emergence of international events that led to Islamic resurgence like the triumph of Islamist revolution in Iran in brought influences to many predominantly Muslim countries.
In Indonesia, as elsewhere, the process of Islamic revivalism began to affect students in secular universities who come from various backgrounds. Instead, they were more likely to call themselves Muslims without applying an adjective, in an effort not to Village Indonesia, Cornell University Modern Indonesian Project, Ithaca, Since the late s, the Suharto regime began responding positively to demands from various Islamic organisations.
The Ministry of Religious Affairs presented to parliament a bill expanding the authority of Islamic courts. It also published a compilation of Islamic law. The Catholic editor of the weekly popular tabloid Monitor was put in jail for three years for announcing a poll which discredited the Prophet Muhammad as the 11th most admired person below President Suharto.
The birth of ICMI in the late , above all, was perceived as the most striking evidence of the new centrality of Islam in Indonesian public life. In , Suharto himself moved his public identity towards Islam by undertaking a pilgrimage to Mecca, and then adopting the name Haji Muhammad Suharto. See also, R. The crisis was markedly evident in the dramatic decline in the value of Indonesian currency rupiah.
Thousands of enterprises, from small to large-scale businesses, collapsed. Since the outbreak of the crisis, people became increasingly frustrated by miserable socio-economic conditions. Unemployment levels jumped to the highest level since the s. As a result of the sharp increase in prices, the number of people living below the poverty line increased to around 50 percent of the total population. The crisis was a trigger for a series of student demonstrations.
Reformasi Total, Mentari, Jakarta, The crisis did not only cause an increase in poverty, unemployment and food shortages, but also put the state in a vulnerable and weak position unable to overcome the social tensions that escalated and exploded into larger-scale violent riots throughout the archipelago.
Suharto was finally forced to resign from office and B. J Habibie was then sworn in as the President of Indonesia on 21 May Facing strong opposition from various quarters due to his close association with Suharto, Habibie was forced to conduct a fair and transparent election as soon as possible. PK also seized the momentum of the removal of Pancasila as the sole basis by announcing Islam as the official basis of the new Islamist party. By applying the political opportunity framework, the use of these kinds of organisations is most often seen in less democratic political systems where overt protest and visible institutions are more vulnerable to suppression.
Finally, following the fall of Suharto in , Tarbiyah advocates seized the momentum by establishing PK, now known as PKS, to pursue their ideals within the framework of a democratic system.
Illustration 4 Caption: Nonetheless, political opportunities alone do not make a movement. Even the most conducive political environment will be to no avail if the movement does not have sufficient organisation and networks to realise its political potential. The study of means has come to be known as resource mobilisation1 or mobilising structure approaches. In an attempt to describe the organisational strength of PKS, I will emphasise its cadres, organisational models and leadership, communication networks and financial assets.
Unfortunately, there is little agreement on the definition of resources. In his definition, Tilly argues that one of the most important resources of mobilisation is the formal and informal networks that connect individuals and movement organisations. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Most commonly, resources refer to material resources, most notably time and money. In addition to this, I follow two categories of resource mobilisation, that is, material and immaterial resources, which include: Massachusetts, , p.
Nonetheless, a focus on social movement theories in Western traditions tends to equate social movement organisations SMOs with formal and visible organisations,16 thereby neglecting informal forms of collective action. Braungart ed. Given that these aforementioned forms of Tarbiyah organisational activity have been mentioned in Chapter 2, in this section I will discuss them very briefly, and just focus on the perspective of resource mobilisation.
First of all, the spirit of Islamic revivalism among Islamic students in secular universities began to flourish from the s with the establishment of a dakwah network centred in campus mosques. Through mosques, the growing interest in Islamic studies and practices among students was facilitated. They prayed together and congregated for the khutbah Friday sermons in mosques as well as conducted a number of religious study circles and trainings such as liqa meeting every week , mabit staying the whole night at mosques , daurah training program.
This intensive religious training attracted a large number of students and its alumni were spread out not only in Java, but also in Sumatra. Interestingly, since LDK was a formal student organisation established on campus, it became automatically one of the Student Activity Units Unit 19 Ibid.
As an officially recognised student body, LDK was used by dakwah activists to carry out regular recruitment campaigns among incoming students.
The straight victories of dakwah activists in securing student senate positions both at the faculty and university level at UI have inspired their colleagues in other prestigious universities, such as ITB, IPB, and UGM to take over the student senates on their own campuses. The formation of KAMMI signaled that Tarbiyah was beginning gradually to expand its networks with campus dakwah groups, allowing its activists to take to 22 Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan, , pp.
Since the formation of PK, all Tarbiyah members automatically became PK members and all religious circles and training activities were taken over by PK. The complexities emerged immediately after the party set up its organisational structures. In general, Tarbiyah resembled an isolated SMO, which had no branches and relied heavily on direct contact between its members, which 23 Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia, See also, Klandermans, The Social Psychology, , pp.
They said that the features of the structure are the following: See, Klandermans, The Social Psychology, , p. The formal composition of DPP is a president, a deputy president, department heads, secretary general and treasurer. There are over members on the full DPP. The four highest levels are called kader inti, core cadres who have the right to vote for the Majelis Syuro representatives.
The four highest levels called core cadres are granted opportunities to vote for the Council. Unfortunately, some provinces do not have enough core cadres so that they cannot elect their own representatives in the Council.
Accordingly, in order to represent them, the elect-members of the Council select their representatives. Interestingly, PKS also operates at the lowest level of government, that is, at village levels desa or kelurahan by forming village-level branches called Dewan Pimpinan Ranting DPRa.
The ability of PKS to set up local party units nation-wide shows that it began gradually to expand its organisational structures and networks in order to attract new voters other than PKS traditional voters. The PKS general- secretary Anis Matta claimed that the party successfully increased their votes in in sub-districts or villages where new PKS branches had been found. Accordingly, in the run-up to the elections, Matta predicted that PKS sub-district level 39 Suharto argued that the political parties were always trying to gain mass support for the sake of their own political interests.
Likewise, the presence of party conflicts in the past had harmed village people. The issuance of Article Mo. Ironically, the ruling party Golkar was exempted from this limitation so that they could reach all the village people day-to-day activities.
Dissertation at Hawaii University, Unlike New Order parties i. Golkar, PPP and PDI-P44 which took advantage of a government decision permitting them to keep their existing assets and party offices,45 PKS had to build up its branch structures from scratch, using relatively new personnel and infrastructures. However, the secretive nature of Tarbiyah during Suharto period and its lack of assets and infrastructure relative to NU and Muhammadiyah, mean that it was less able to give PK a flying start.
Similarly, despite PAN styling itself as a pluralist party, it benefited from its close links to the largest Modernist Muslim organisation, Muhammadiyah.
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