Heidegger introduction to metaphysics pdf

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Since its publication in , Introduction to Metaphysics has been one of Martin. Heidegger's most widely read works, second perhaps only to Being and Time. In this translation I do not hope to solve Heidegger's ambiguities or explain them For Heidegger, an introduction such as his "Introduction into Metaphysics". Heidegger, Martin. Introduction to Metaphysics. Translated by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt. New Haven: Yale University Press, First published in

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MARTIN HEIDEGGER. Introduction to Metaphysics. New translation by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt. NB YALE NOTA BENE. Yale University Press New. Page iii. Introduction to Metaphysics Martin Heidegger New translation by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt. Page iv. Originally published as Einführung in die. of Hazrat Mawlana Jalaluddin Rumi's work, regardless of who they are and Immersing oneself in the ocean of love and co.

July The mysteriousness of Being 2. Who can lay hold of this? The Platonic and Aristotelian interpretation ofphusis as "idea" d. Page viii importance he attached to this work that Heidegger chose this course.

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Volume 1 , Issue 2 April Pages Related Information. Email or Customer ID. Forgot your password? Forgot password? Old Password. New Password. Your password has been changed. The question embraces all that is. The question is there in heartfelt joy. Page 2 the muffled tolling of a bell that resounds into Dasein1 and gradually fades away.

It comes to a halt at no being of any kind whatsoever. But it is the first question in another sense—namely.

The question is there in a spell of boredom. The question "Why are there beings at all instead of nothing? Ab-grund ist.

What is put into question comes into relation with a ground. This why-question does not just skim the surface. Just as it is the broadest question. But because we are questioning. From what ground do beings come? On what ground do beings stand? To what ground do beings go? Page 3 the start about the whole of what is. The questioning seeks the ground for what is.

Ur-grund ist. Why—that is. Why are there beings at all. After nature had taken a few breaths. We do mean beings as a whole. We can compare it to a tiny grain of sand. And yet the question should not be about some particular. Page 4 surface and shallowness. Given the unrestricted range of the question. What do we mean by that? If we consider our question in the whole breadth of what it puts into question. Thus if we properly pursue the question "Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?

Some elephant in some jungle in India is in being just as much as some chemical oxidation process on the planet Mars. It was the proudest and most mendacious minute in "world history". For what is this being. Let us consider the Earth within the dark immensity of space in the universe. Nietzsche's essay begins: But if beings as a whole are ever brought into our question. Why the Why?

What is the ground of this why-question itself. What is asked in this question rebounds upon the questioning itself. Is this "first" question not the first in rank after all. For through this questioning. Is this Why.

To be sure—whether the question "Why are there beings at all instead of nothing? Within beings as a whole there is no justification to be found for emphasizing precisely this being that is called the human being and among which we ourselves happen to belong.

The why-question challenges beings as a [4] whole. Page 5 And what is a human lifespan amid millions of years? Barely a move of the second hand. But this is precisely how the questioning gains its distinction. The asking of this question is not. Walter Kaufmann New York: The Portable Nitzsche.

Then we discover that this distinctive why-question has its ground in a leap by which human beings leap away from all the previous safety of their Dasein. The asking of this question happens only in the leap and as the leap. The planets move in their orbits without this question. The only question is whether we are willing to fall victim to this cheap look of things and thus take the whole matter as settled. Therefore this questioning in itself is not some arbitrary process but rather a distinctive occurrence that we call a happening.

But if we do not let ourselves be deceived by the look of things. This question and all the questions immediately rooted in it. Page 6 soever to beings themselves. The vigor of life flows through plant and animal without this question. But if this question is posed.

It runs up against the search for its own Why. The question "Why the Why? The question loses its rank at once in the sphere of a human-historical Dasein to whom questioning as an originary power remains foreign. For now. Because the question "Why are there beings at all instead of nothing? God Himself "is" as the uncreated Creator. Page 7 stands. According to the genuine meaning of the word. One who holds on to such faith as a basis can.

As the broadest and deepest question. We want to be clear about this from the start: Our question is the question of all true questions—that is. No questioning. In this threefold sense the question is the first in rank. Only ages that really no longer believe in the true greatness of the task of theology arrive at the pernicious opinion that. Philosophizing means asking: On the other hand. Quite aside from whether this sentence of the Bible is true or untrue for faith.

Page 8 in a certain way. To be sure. Whenever such a venture occurs. It has no relation to it. That is then theology. This is neither having faith nor questioning. What is really asked in our question is. A "Christian philosophy" is a round square and a misunderstanding. He can act only "as if"—. It becomes an agreement with oneself to adhere in the future to a doctrine as something that has somehow been handed down. Philosophy consists in such foolishness.

All essential questioning in philosophy necessarily remains untimely. Therefore we cannot determine what the task of philosophy in itself and in general is. What is untimely will have its own times. But whoever engages in philosophy must know a few things.

That which has no direct resonance Widerklang in everydayness can stand in innermost harmony Einklang with the authentic happening in the history of a people.

They can be stated briefly. This holds for philosophy. Page 9 If we now wanted to talk about philosophy. It can even be its prelude Vorklang. Philosophizing always remains a kind of knowing that not only does not allow itself to be made timely but. But what is useless can nevertheless be a power—a power in the rightful sense. Whenever this seemingly does take place. This procedure is necessary. There is no gradual transition from the customary by which the question could slowly become more familiar.

The more this form resists comparison with others. One can only say what philosophy cannot be and what it cannot achieve. The other involves a distortion of the sense of what philosophy can achieve. We have explained in what sense it is meant as the first. Philosophy is one of the few autonomous creative possibilities.

The current misinterpretations of philosophy. This is why it must be posed in advance. One misinterpretation consists in demanding too much of the essence of philosophy. We therefore conclude the preliminary remarks with this session's discussions. A question has been posed: Here we will mention only two. Every essential form of spirit is open to ambiguity.

Every stage and every inception of its unfolding carries within it its own law. Page 10 be demanded of philosophy.

This readily gives the impression that. Thus we have not yet asked this question. But such expectations and requirements demand too much of the capability and essence of philosophy. Page 11 philosophy can and must provide a foundation for the current and future historical Dasein of a people in every age.

That is just as clever as saying that because one cannot fly with a carpenter's bench. Against this first misinterpretation. The second misinterpretation that we mention is a distortion of the sense of what philosophy can achieve.

It spreads only indirectly. Philosophy can never directly supply the forces and create the mechanisms and opportunities that bring about a historical state of affairs. According to this distortion. Granted that philosophy is unable to lay the foundation of a culture.

Which few? The ones who transform creatively. One says. And the avenues and views of such a knowing are opened up by philosophy. One believes that one has had the experience oneself. One expects philosophy to promote. This often happens in a way that seems entirely innocuous and is quickly convincing.

But fate is there only where a true knowing about things rules over Dasein. Burdening gives back to things. Their customary. The misinterpretations by which philosophy remains constantly besieged are mainly promoted by what people like us do.

This then looks as though it itself were philosophy. But you should become mindful and be on your guard. And why? Because burdening is one of the essential and fundamental conditions for the arising of everything great.

And it does so not just incidentally. When we mention and correct both of these misinterpretations. Page 12 of their labor by meditating on the presuppositions of the sciences. The burdening of historical Dasein. Nietzsche once said VII. At the outset we spoke of a question: We ask beyond the usual. Whenever we set out in the direction of this question. Yet as we merely intimated at first. For a little epilogue arises in the form of a counterquestion: This means that this questioning does not lie 8 Beyond Good and Evil.

Page 13 are especially current among teachers and researchers in the sciences. When one attempts to prove that. Let that suffice for us as an explication of what philosophy is not. It is entirely correct and completely in order to say. Heidegger's references to Nietzsche cite the edition of his works published in Leipzig by C.


We pass over and surpass what belongs to the order of the day. The questioning itself is out-of-order. This translation of Greek into Roman was not an arbitrary and innocu[11] ous process but was the first stage in the isolation and alienation of the originary essence of Greek philosophy.

The same Nietzsche says: Nor does this questioning lie in the sphere of urgent concern and the satisfaction of dominant needs.

Pdf heidegger introduction to metaphysics

Page 14 along our way. This is true not only of the Latin translation of this word but of all other translations of Greek philosophical language into Roman. In the age of the first and definitive unfolding of Western philosophy among the Greeks. Nor does it stand in the familiar order of the everyday. It is completely voluntary. This fundamental Greek word for beings is usually translated as "nature.

The Middle Ages trans-lated themselves into modem philosophy. Does it just mean to increase by acquiring bulk. Phusis is Being itself. But phusis. In the word. But now we leap over this whole process of deformation and decline. Phusis as emergence can be experienced everywhere: It was not in natural processes that the Greeks first experienced what phusis is. This inception is taken as something that we have left behind long ago and supposedly overcome.

The noun phusis corresponds to the verb phuein. For this reason. Page 15 ern philosophy. Now what does the word phusis say? It says what emerges from itself for example. In fact. Then the inception of Greek philosophy.

The phrase in den Stand bringen ordinarily means to enable. But whatever is great can only begin great. Disregarding all the particular absurdities involved in conceiving of the inception of Western philosophy as primitive. Page 16 call phusis disclosed itself to them. Thus phusis originally means both heaven and earth.

Phusis means the [12] emerging sway. Thus the Greeks become in principle a better kind of Hottentot. Only on the basis of this disclosure could they then take a look at nature in the narrower sense.

This emerging. Phusis is the event of standing forth. As a counterphenomenon there arose what the Greeks call thesis. So it is with the philosophy of the Greeks. What is. Page 17 what is greatest. Only the everyday understanding and the small man imagine that the great must endure forever. The great begins great. It came to an end in greatness with Aristotle. We oppose to the physical the "psychical. But this is not what is moral but instead what concerns mores.

Only the small begins small—the small. An echo of knowledge about the originary meaning still survives in Aristotle. Let it be mentioned just in passing that already within Greek philosophy. Metaphysics G. But all this. In Greek. It would require a special study to clarify what is essentially the same in phusis and techne. Plato's Phaedrus? This is then experienced. William McNeill Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Thomas Sheehan.

At this point we do 14 Phaedrus d—b is devoted to determining how rhetoric can become a proper techne and what is required in general of a proper techne. When one asks about phusis in general. Philosophical questioning about beings as such is meta ta phusika. Page 18 comportment and attitude. The question about Being as such is then just another transcendental question. According to our explanation of phusis. Page 19 not need to trace the history of the genesis and meaning of this term in detail.

Metaphysics stands as the name for the center and core that determines all philosophy. This misconstrual of the question about Being as such blocks the way to unfolding it in a manner befitting the matter. Even in the doctrine of Being as actus purus Thomas Aquinas. The question we have identified as first in rank—"Why are there beings at all instead of nothing? The "introduction to metaphysics" attempted here keeps in view this confused condition of the "question of Being.

But this talk of the "oblivion of Being" is just as ambiguous as the expression "question of Being. This meaning of the expression is also appropriate both in terms of the matter at stake and in terms of language. Page 20 "transcendental" meant there does not pertain to subjective consciousness. But if we think the question of Being in the sense of the question about Being as such. This drags into indeterminacy all questioning that concerns Being in any way.

Being remains forgotten. But if we think along the lines of Being and Time. If one chooses the designation "metaphysics" for the treatment of the "question of Being" in an indefinite sense. For at first it seems as.

The fundamental question of the lecture course is of a different kind than the guiding question of metaphysics. Thus the leading into the asking of the fundamental question is not a passage over to something that lies or stands around somewhere. | Martin Heidegger | Metaphysics

Questions are not given like shoes. The tide of the course is thus deliberately ambiguous. Page 21 though the questioning held itself within the purview of beings as such.

Disclosedness means: Leading is a questioning going-ahead. There can be such schools only in the sphere of scientific or professional labor. Whenever one finds pretensions to a following. Questions are as they are actually asked.

To pdf introduction heidegger metaphysics

This is a leadership that essentially has no following. Taking Being and Time as its point of departure. Such labor 17 "Erschlossenheit besagt: Aufgeschlossenheit dessen. In such a sphere. But the best professional ability will never replace the authentic strength of seeing and questioning and saying. To pronounce the interrogative sentence, even in a questioning tone, is not yet to question. We can already see this in the [16] fact that even if we repeat the interrogative sentence several times over and over, this does not necessarily make the questioning attitude any livelier; on the contrary, reciting the sentence repeatedly may well blunt the questioning.

Although the interrogative sentence thus is not the question and is not questioning, neither should it be taken as a mere linguistic form of communication, as if the sentence were only a statement "about" a question.

If I say to you, "Why are there beings at all instead of nothing? Certainly the spoken interrogative sentence can also be taken this way, but then one is precisely not hearing the questioning. The questioning does not result in any shared questioning and self-questioning. It awakens nothing in the way of a questioning attitude, or even a questioning disposition.

For this consists in a willing-to-know. Willing—this is not just wishing and trying. Whoever wishes to know also seems to question; but he does not get beyond saying the question, he stops short precisely where the question begins.

Questioning is willing-to-know. Whoever wills, whoever lays his whole Dasein into a will, is resolute. Resoluteness delays nothing, does not shirk, but acts from the moment and without fail.

Open resoluteness is no mere resolution to act; it is the decisive inception of action that reaches ahead of and through all action. To will is to be resolute.

But the essence of open resoluteness Ent-schlossenheit lies in the de-concealment Ent-borgenheit of. But the relation to Being is letting. That all willing should be grounded in letting strikes the understanding as strange.

See the lecture "On the Essence of Truth," Truth is the openness of beings. To know is accordingly to be able to stand in the openness of beings, to stand up to it. Merely to have information, however wide-ranging it may be, is not to know. Even if this information is focused on what is practically most important through courses of study and examination requirements, it is not knowledge.

Even if this information, cut back to the most compelling needs, is "dose to life," its possession is not knowledge. One who carries such information around with him and has added a few practical tricks to it will still be at a loss and will necessarily bungle [17] in the face of real reality, which is always different from what the philistine understands by closeness to life and closeness to reality. Because he has no knowledge, since to know means to be able to learn.

Of course, everyday understanding believes that one has knowledge when one needs to learn nothing more, because one has finished learning. The only one who knows is the one who understands that he must always learn again, and who above all, on the basis of this understanding, has brought himself to the point where he continually can learn.

This is far harder than possessing information. Being able to learn presupposes being able to question. Questioning is the willing-to-know that we discussed earlier: Because we are concerned with asking the question that is first in rank, All the less will the interrogative sentence exhaustively reproduce the question, even if it is genuinely said in a questioning way and heard in a partnership of questioning.

The question that does indeed resonate in the interrogative sentence, but nevertheless remains closed off and enveloped there, must first be developed. In this way the questioning attitude must clarify and secure itself, establish itself through exercise.

Our next task consists in unfolding the question "Why are there beings at all instead of nothing? To begin with, the question is accessible in the interrogative sentence. The sentence takes a stab, as it were, at the question. Hence its linguistic formulation must be correspondingly broad and loose. Let us consider our interrogative sentence in this respect.

The posing of the question includes: For what is interrogated is indicated unequivocally: What is asked about, what is asked, is the Why—that is, the ground. What follows in the interrogative sentence—"instead of nothing? In fact, the question is far more unequivocal and decisive without the appended turn of phrase, which just comes from the superfluity of imprecise talk.

For what more are we supposed to ask about Nothing? Nothing is simply nothing. Questioning has nothing more to seek here. Above all, by bringing up Nothing we do not gain the slightest thing for the knowledge of beings. In speaking about Nothing, he makes it into a something. By speaking this way, he speaks against what he means.

He contra-dicts himself. But self-contradictory speech is an offense against the fundamental rule of speech logos , against "logic. Whoever talks and thinks illogically is an unscientific person. Now whoever goes so far as to talk about Nothing within philosophy, which after all is the home of logic, deserves all the more to be accused of offending against the fundamental rule of all thinking. Such talk about Nothing consists in utterly senseless propositions.

Moreover, whoever takes Nothing seriously takes the side of nullity. He obviously promotes the spirit of negation and serves disintegration. Talking about Nothing is not only completely contrary to thought, but it undermines all culture and all faith. On the one side of this alternative we have, then, the world that is, in its totality; on the other side, in contrast, we have only Nothing as the not-Being of the world. What does this alternative tell us as regards knowledge of the world?

One will want to answer simply: The world remains exactly what it was, and what it is, if we oppose Nothing to it as not-the-world. He concludes his book — with an analysis of Heidegger's "What is Metaphysics? In Rickert's reading of Heidegger, "the Nothing is the something for which we have no predicates" Whatever both disregards the fundamental law of thinking and also destroys faith and the will to construct is pure nihilism.

Given such considerations, we will do well to strike from our interrogative sentence the superfluous turn of phrase "instead of nothing? But in asking the question we stand within a tradition.

For philosophy has constantly and always asked about the ground of beings. With this question it had its inception, in this question it will find its end, provided that it comes to an end in greatness and not in a powerless decline.

The question about what is not and about Nothing has gone side by side with the question of what is, since its inception. But it does not do so superficially, as an accompanying phenomenon; instead, the question about Nothing takes shape in accordance with the breadth, depth, and originality with which the question about beings is asked on each occasion, and conversely.

The manner of asking about Nothing can serve as a gauge and a criterion for the manner of asking about beings. Our introduction of talk about Nothing here is not a careless and overly enthusiastic manner of speaking, nor our own invention, but merely strict respect for the originary tradition regarding the sense of the fundamental question.

Still, this talk of Nothing remains contrary to thought in general, and leads to disintegration in particular. But what if both the concern for the proper respect for the fundamental rules of thinking as well as the fear of nihilism, which would both like to advise. This is in fact the case. Of course, the misunderstanding that is being played out here is not accidental.

Its ground is a lack of understanding that has long ruled the question about beings. But this lack of understanding stems from an oblivion of Being that is getting increasingly rigid. For it cannot be decided so readily whether logic and its fundamental rules can provide any measure for the question about beings as such.

It could be the other way around, that the whole logic that we know and that we treat like a gift from heaven is grounded in a very definite answer to the question about beings, and that consequently any thinking that simply follows the laws of thought of established logic is intrinsically incapable of even beginning to understand the question about beings, much less of actually unfolding it and leading it toward an answer.

In truth, it is only an illusion of rigor and scientificity when one appeals to the principle of contradiction, and to logic in general, in order to prove that all thinking and talk about Nothing is contradictory and therefore senseless. Whoever speaks against logic is suspected, implicitly or explicitly, of arbitrariness.

This mere suspicion already counts as an argument and an objection, and one takes oneself to be exempted from further, authentic reflection. One cannot, in fact, talk about and deal with Nothing as if it were a thing, such as the rain out there, or a mountain, or any object at all; Nothing remains in principle inaccessible to all science.

Who[20] ever truly wants to talk of Nothing must necessarily become unscientific. But this is a great misfortune only if one believes that scientific thinking alone is the authentic, rigorous thinking, that it alone can and must be made the measure even of philosophical thinking. But the possibility of such speech about Nothing can be indicated. This is why we cannot begin to speak about Nothing immediately. Page 28 But the reverse is the case. But aside from the philosopher.

Talking about Nothing remains forever an abomination and an absurdity for science. Consider a passage from one of the latest works of the poet Knut Hamsun. Because of this superiority. Philosophy can never belong to the same order as the sciences. It belongs to a higher order. Only poetry is of the same order as philosophical thinking. It does not allow itself to be made common. The Road Leads On.

It dissolves. In the poetry of the poet and in the thinking of the thinker. True talk of Nothing always remains unfamiliar. Hamsun's "August" trilogy begins with Landstrykere The work belongs together with The Wayfarer and August. Philosophy never arises from or through science. All scientific thinking is just a derivative and rigidified form of philosophical thinking. Philosophy stands in a completely different domain and rank of spiritual Dasein.

We have translated it here from the German. Sandmeier and S. On the ocean earlier. The second novel is August In his last days. The poet says: Thus we want to take up our interrogative sentence again and question through it.

Page 29 of this man August. McFarlane New York: One can only shake one's head in resignation. The conclusion of the trilogy. To this end. Ungermann Munich: Albert Langen. They are. The most recent English translation is Wayfarers.

Here—nothing meets nothing and is not there. He also inserts the dash after "here" at the beginning of the next sentence. Quite amusing. Men Livet Lever They are given to us.

August often went to sea 22 something stirred at least. Heidegger incorrectly calls the novel Der Landstreicher. Now the beings given to us in this way are immediately interrogated as to their ground. Page 30 found before us at any time. In this way. One asks: This kind of questioning is represented in the simple formula: Why are there beings?

Where and what is their ground? Tacitly one is asking after another. Somewhere in the vineyard. Why are beings torn from the possibility of not-Being? Why do they not fall back into it constantly with no further ado? Beings are now no longer what just happens to be present at hand. From now on. The search for the Why now transforms itself accordingly.

But here the question does not pertain at all to beings as a whole and as such. But now if we ask the question in the form of our initial interrogative sentence—"Why are there beings at all instead of nothing? It does not just try to provide a present-at-hand ground for explaining what is present at hand—instead.

The oscillation of this wavering reaches out into the most extreme and sharpest counterpossibility of beings. Such a method just broadens and enlarges. The questioning advances directly toward a ground. Our Dasein. Dasein is "in each case mine". They remain what they are and as they are. Page 31 for a ground that is supposed to ground the dominance of beings as an overcoming of Nothing.

Dasein is itself by virtue of its essential relation to Being in general.

And yet beings are not able to shrug off what is. The ground in question is now questioned as the ground of the decision for beings over against Nothing—more precisely. This is what the oft-repeated sentence in Being and Time means: Dasein is thrown to me so that my self may be Dasein. With our question we establish ourselves among beings in such a way that they forfeit their self-evidence as beings.

Insofar as beings come to waver within the broadest and harshest possibility of oscillation—the "either beings—or nothing"—the questioning itself loses every secure foothold. But Dasein means: But beings are not changed by our questioning. After all. By no means do we experience this possibility as something that is just added on by our own thought. This Possible belongs to the chalk. The elimination of this prejudice is part of the unfolding of our question. Our questioning just opens up the domain so that beings can break open in such questionworthiness.

But that is a prejudice. As certainly as it belongs precisely to this thing to lie here. It is simply a matter of not being seduced by overhasty theories.

Page 32 worthy of questioning: In this questioning. Insofar as beings stand up against the extreme possibility of not-Being. It itself has in itself a definite appropriateness for a definite use.

Every being. This piece of chalk here is an extended. The possibility of being drawn along the blackboard and used up is not something that we merely add onto the thing with our thought. Yet it is this questioning that pushes us into the open. What we know about how such questioning happens is all too little and all too crude. The chalk itself. But then. Suddenly we are speaking here about the not-Being and Being of beings. Are they the same? The being and its Being?

The distinction! In accordance with this twofold meaning of the word "being. Page 33 they have never thereby overtaken and overcome the possibility of not-Being. Already this question is ambiguous. On the one hand. We were able to find this out relatively easily. Normally meaning "goods. We have catalogued what the being is in the piece of chalk. We could also easily see that the chalk can also not be. Is it the same as the being? We ask this once again. We ask. Now where is Being situated? It must after all belong to the chalk.

But what are we really asking? Why beings as such are. We are asking about the ground for the fact that beings are.

We have already made some remarks about this popular question of what comes of such distinctions. Distinguishing Being on top of this is artificial and leads to nothing. We are interrogating beings in regards to their Being. But how? We are asking about the Being of beings. We are asking at bottom about Being. One could answer: But even this distinction made only in thought is questionable. Page 34 distinguished from that which can stand in Being or fall back into not-Being.

Let us now simply reflect on our enterprise. But we did not include Being in our earlier catalogue of attributes—we listed only material mass. But if we persevere in the questioning.

We encounter beings everywhere. Over there. So it is all the more necessary for us to get dear from the outset about how it stands for us at present with Being and with our understanding of Being. A being.

If we pose this question about Being as the first question in rank. How are we even supposed to inquire into the ground for the Being of beings. So it turns out that the question "Why are there beings at all instead of nothing? A few examples should help. Everywhere we 25 "Wie steht es um das Sein?

Here it is important above all to impress on our experience again and again the fact that we are not able to lay hold of the Being of beings directly and expressly. Page 35 [25] itself is not already in itself a ground and ground enough. We can scour every side of the building from the outside. This enterprise would be just as hopeless as if someone wanted to explain the cause and ground of a fire and declared that he need not bother with the course of the fire or the investigation of its scene.

And so it is with the other senses. The Being of this being belongs to it if anything does. Can we see Being?

We see beings—the chalk here. We always hear more [than the mere noise]. We hear the flying bird. The scent provides the Being of this being much more directly and truly than it could be communicated by any description or inspection.

Heidegger – Introduction to Metaphysics - Light In Masonry

We hear the grouse flying off through the mountain forest in its gliding flight Yet really we are only hearing the noise of the motor's rattling. Being does not consist in our observing beings. Where does Being lie and in what does it consist? But do we see Being as we see color and light and dark? Or do we hear. Page 36 find beings. For us. We can come across it only because it already is. We touch velvet. Where now is the Being of this high school?

It is.