Foucault. Gilles Deleuze. Translated and edited by. SEAN HAND. Foreword by. PAUL BOV£. University of Minnesota Press. Minneapolis. London. Gilles Deleuze- Foucault - Free download as PDF File .pdf) or read online for free. Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, which discusses the links between the selected essays and interviews by Michel Foucault' edited by Donald F. Bouchard.
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soundofheaven.info (file size: MB, MIME type: application/ pdf). Expand view. File history. Click on a date/time to view the. Wiki for Collaborative Studies of Arts, Media and Humanities. File:Deleuze Gilles Foucault soundofheaven.info soundofheaven.info (file size: MB, MIME type: Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, trans.
Michel Foucault, Less disciplinary it may be, but this does not make it non- or anti- or post- The Birth of disciplinary. Chivi Spear. It is important to note, however, that the overcoding of facialization is not a textualization of the vis- ual. The leap into a milieu where all these limits are exceeded is accomplished in the last version. Foucault, M. The Language that Rises:
Deleuze para-principiantes. Upcoming SlideShare. Like this document?
Why not share! The refrain has three inseparable components, or moments: In nature, territorial animals build a habitat by extend- ing the rhythms of an emergent point of order to the circumfer- ence of a specific territory, but that territory always is open to the cosmos. How might the various arts be situated in regard to this model, if we consider it in its most literal, physical sense?
Architecture would seem to be the art most directly related to the model, in that an inhabited build- ing in an open space would be a material manifestation of the triad of landscape-house-becomings.
Next would come sculpture, whose three-dimensional objects occupy a physical space, and often an actual landscape. The alliance of architecture and sculpture as modellings of spa- tial relations, in fact, is such that one might with considerable caution regard architecture as a utilitarian form of sculpture. Third would come iconic figurations of the model, such as cin- ema and painting, in that both arts frequently offer visual ana- logues of actual landscapes, habitats and inhabitants.
Theatre might be included here, though primarily as performance prac- tice rather than written text.
It is in their remarks on literature in What Is Philosophy? In most fiction, landscapes are sec- ondary elements that merely provide the setting within which actions transpire. Fictions involve stories, linear sequences of action, whereas settings, especially landscapes, generally mani- fest a static or cyclical temporality. In his essay on T.
There is, in fact, an explicit opposition of images to narratives that one can find in Deleuze. Narratives exist in film, but only as secondary derivations of images. It is through words, between words, that one sees and hears.
One must say of every writer: Writers push words to their limits, evoking images while at the same time forcing language itself to stutter and stammer and thereby produce an asignifying music. Implicit in this valoriza- tion of visions and auditions is an opposition of the discursive and the nondiscursive, with nondiscursive visions and audi- tions arising at the limits of the discursive.
Why privilege the nondiscursive dimension of literature? Deleuze praises Foucault for recognizing within power relations the incommensurable strata of visibilities and statements. Regimes of light bring forth what may be seen, whereas regimes of signs determine what may be said. The two strata are separate, yet there is also a primacy of statements over visibilities. The implication of this analysis is that lan- guage has an inherent tendency to dominate the visible and the nondiscursive as a whole.
The facialized landscape, coded and coordinated in its operation with the despotic-passional regimes, then, is but one manifestation of this tendency. Image and Text limits and produce images and sounds, visions and auditions, which escape the hold of regimes of signs and take on a life of their own.
And in this cinematic affinity we might find a means of account- ing for literary narrative such that it is no longer the mere manifestation of linguistic codes and cultural conventions. But a reading of Cinema 1 and Cinema 2 as guides to literary narra- tive is beyond the scope of this essay. The landscape of faciality is a landscape of stratification, part of a face-landscape complex co-functioning with the mixed semiotic of the despotic and passional regimes of signs.
The landscape of sensation is a landscape of destratification, of percepts which are intimately related to affects. The house may be part of a territorial habitat, but it always communicates with a plane of deterritorialization. Notes 1 In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari remark on the close relationship between the face and the cinematic close-up Deleuze and Guattari, , pp.
In Cinema 1, Deleuze dis- cusses the face and the close-up at length Deleuze, , pp.
Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, trans. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam Minneapolis: The Time-Image, trans. Tomlinson and R. Galeta Minneapolis: The Logic of Sensation, trans. Smith Minneapolis: Tomlinson and G.
Burchell New York: Columbia University Press, Maldiney, H. Regard espace parole Lausanne: Translations my own. Chapter 2 Bim Bam Bom Bem: Like Kafka, Beckett kills off metaphor, symbolism and signifi- cation in order to unleash metamorphosis and movement for its own sake.
What will be the last word, and how can it be recognized? In television.
However, in the original play, Bam has an additional manifestation as the Voice of Bam V. After setting the scene through a wordless rehearsal, in which the four identical figures enter and leave the playing area like pieces in a board game, the Voice calls on Bam who remains onstage until the very end of the play and sets events in motion.
First, Bam greets Bom, and demands the results of his interrogation of an unnamed sub- ject. Bam accuses him of lying, and the Voice then summons Bim. After a season passes, Bim reports back to Bam, with the same results: Bam, increasingly mistrustful and paranoid, now accuses Bim of lying.
The Voice summons Bem, and the pro- cess goes through yet another cycle, with Bem torturing Bim to reveal what Bom was hiding from Bam. After another season passes, Bem returns with the same negative results. He leads Bem from the stage, return- ing alone after another season has passed — his head bowed in obvious defeat, ready to start another cycle. Apparently sat- isfied, the Voice concludes: I am alone. It is winter. Without journey. Time passes. That is all. Make sense who may.
I switch off. What Where is sparse and open-ended enough as a text to invite a broad range of interpretations. This suggests a meta-communicative site where signifying and creative processes play through a sin- gular mind fragmented into four discrete images: The text could thus be read as a fugitive memory turning over in a singular brain, replayed cyclically as a repetitive interior monodrama, caught in the web of textual forces from which there is no escape.
However, the revised television version suggests the possibil- ity of an alternative reading. First, the television screen now replaces the quadrangular playing area of the stage, while the actors now fade in or out of the blank ground as fugitive, dis- embodied floating faces much like shimmering death masks instead of entering and exiting from the margins of the set.
Consequently, they become repetitive, ghostly fragments of a broader aggregate of images set against a potentially infinite plane of immanence. This itself becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, for the phenomenal becomes depend- ent upon the act of repetition itself — indeed it demands repe- tition in order to sustain itself, as pure affirmation. Finally, the Voice of Bam and the diegetic character of Bam are present on screen at the same time, a distorted face with an electronically altered voice replacing the earlier stage prop of the megaphone.
Bam is thus equalized in relation to his other three manifestations within both the master and the diegetic narrative, reinforced by the flattening, horizontalizing effect of the televi- sion picture plane, which makes it even harder to individuate the four characters.
As in the case of the text itself — and its cyclical corol- laries of torture and interrogation — technology is equated with the agency of control over bodily forces. Moreover, with televi- sion there is no ostensible spatio-temporal beginning or end, entrance or exit. Instead of semantic closure or understanding, there is merely a switching on or off, in much the same way that networks continue to broadcast whether we are tuned in or not.
As a result, the spatial parameters of What Where now more closely resemble an audio-visual rhizome or cybernetic line of flight. As semiosis becomes exhausted, intensity and affect become possible, suggesting that the final product of a repeti- tive matrix is an endless plane of immanence.
First staged in September with Jessica Tandy in the leading role, Not I was adapted for television in as a bravura starring vehicle for Billie Whitelaw. It takes the form of an extended monologue spoken by the spot-lit Mouth of a year-old woman — shot in extreme close-up against a black ground in the television ver- sion — who relates to a silent Auditor what appears to be an auto- biographical account-cum-confession of her lonely and largely uneventful life.
Taken as a simple chronological narrative what the Russian Formalists would call the fabula , the story is simple enough.
Mouth begins her account with her premature birth, her abandonment by her parents and her lonely childhood in an orphanage, where she was taught to believe in a merciful God. She then tells of how she drifted around in silence for most of her life, punctuating the mundane details of her nar- rative with brief allusions to an unfulfilling sexual interlude, a court trial where she refused to even utter a plea, shopping at the supermarket and then, once or twice a year, a sudden rush of shameful speech.
It was there at dusk, watching her tears dry on her upturned palms that she found herself face down in the grass, with all light extinguished. So far so good. However, the plot or syuzhet of her account is far more complex than a simple reminiscence or autobiography. Indeed, egged on by the silent Auditor, every time she seems to be slipping into the first person she catches herself and reiterates her position as a split subject who must narrate through the discourse of another: This averages 3 words per unit, with 93 per cent of the total containing 5 words or less.
One could argue then that the words spoken by Mouth are not just about something — they are that something itself as pure performance. Beckett himself acknowledged this harness- ing of form by affect, admitting that: Although Mouth is obviously at the end of her tether and verging on incoher- ence, her speech is never completely without meaning.
Instead, she flattens out the effect of her language into a stream of pure intensity. In the original play, the Auditor is defined primarily by his role as listener. His gender is uncertain, as is his relation to Mouth. In their place, we become aware instead of a semiotics of the inexpressible via an awareness of the material qualities of text as pure voice: Indeed, Deleuze has described both works as a form of ritor- nello, after the recurring passage or refrain that recurs in dif- ferent keys throughout a given movement in baroque music.
As its title suggests, Quad I takes the spatial form of a quadrant, filmed from a high angle down using a fixed camera, so that the television frame roughly approximates to the four sides of the stage. Just as the players enter the square separately, so they also leave it, one by one, until the set is quiet.
The four players wear dif- ferent coloured garments, and each is accompanied by a differ- ent percussion instrument. In all, the entire series of courses is performed four times. When Beckett saw the German television technicians checking the colour print of Quad on a black and white monitor, he improvised the idea for a second, much slower performance in monochrome, using white robes and neutral light with the original permutations reduced to a single series.
In this second version, Quad II, a simple metronome replaces the original percussion, which accentuates the sound of shuf- fling feet. The result is a ghostly allegory of Quad I, emphasizing both the repetitive, nonteleological nature of the series, as well as the semiotic properties of the medium itself.
They are unmodified protagonists in an unmodifiable space. All that counts is the series, its course, its order, its speeds and slownesses, which are in turn dependent upon the appearance and disappearance of the protagonists.
Quad thus once again raises the question of exhausting space. The nodal point of this potentiality is the centre, or more specifically the slight dislocation or hiatus that occurs at the centre as the four pro- tagonists swerve to avoid each other. Just at the very point that space seems to be physically emptied out, it is filled up again as intensity, as pure potential.
In Cinema 2, Deleuze discovered the roots of the direct time-image in the cri- sis of the action-image that began with s film noir and subse- quently flourished in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Image and Text it is important to realize that Deleuze allows for these two types of temporality — indirect and direct time — to coexist. He refuses to think them through dialectically or attempt to overcome the contradictions between them.
Instead, Deleuze teases out and celebrates the aporias that arise from their conjunction, without coping with their inconsistencies. Marie-Claire Ropars-Wuilleumier has, correctly I believe, read this move as an attempt to transform matter images in movement into mem- ory images as time , so that the present becomes doubled with the virtual image of the past it must inevitably become. Cinema itself expresses time, its present always ahead of itself, its actual- ity a becoming-virtual at all times.
She makes the logical conclu- sion that Deleuze has moved out of a Bergsonian ontology into a directly Nietzschean one: We thus discover a new aporia at the heart of the time-image, between C. And which is also why images can only be glimpsed through the tears and holes in the fabric of pure time itself. Works Cited Beckett, S. The Complete Dramatic Works London: Image and Text Bogue, R.
Deleuze and Literature New York and London: Routledge, Cohn, R. A Beckett Canon Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, Cinema 2: Uhlmann, Essays Critical and Clinical Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, , pp.
Toward a Minor Literature, trans. Polan Minneapolis: Gontarski, S. Klaver, E. McMullan, A. Theatre on Trial: Reid, A. Ropars-Wuilleumier, M-C.
Boundas and D. Olkowski New York and London: Routledge, , pp. Chapter 3 Where Has Gertrud e Gone? Stein, always eager to publish, happily complied. In the Twentieth Century you feel like movement. The element of movement was not the predominating thing that they felt. You know that in your lives movement is the thing that occupies you most — you feel movement all the time. Image and Text she sought to express in her early portrait writing with the cin- ema Writings 2, p.
But what exactly was the cinema doing? Obviously, the two Cinema books centre on film yet Deleuze b, p. From antiquity on to the modern scientific revolution, movement was consistently reconstituted from fixed instants or positions on a timeline.
Time came in second to something that takes place in it, to a spatial realm in which things move and change but which does not move itself. In such a scheme, movement was little more than the regulated transition from one privileged instant to another. Yet there is more to cinema than moving pictures. Both montage, which is the continuous connecting of various shots, and a mobile camera, which makes the shot become mobile itself, can create dazzling viewpoints in hopping back and forth between several moving bodies.
A movement-image, consequently, does not track a single mov- ing unity yet neither does it give way to a disparate collection of moving objects. Central as movement may be, the films Deleuze discusses in Cinema 1 are not abstract experiments fea- turing movement per se. He focuses on classics with stories built on a basic sensory motor scheme of action and reaction. According to Keith Ansell Pearson , p. Image and Text applauds in Bergson lies exactly in his opposition to an abstract mechanics and his conception of the durational character of life.
Bergson, however, did not find the durational character of life compatible with that most modern and experimental art form, the cinema. In Creative Evolution , p. Taken together they constitute the Bergsonian model of perception, which is open to that infinite multiplicity of becomings real duration implies.
In this scheme there is no hierarchy of becoming, there are no points of anchorage or centres of reference Deleuze, a, p. The Bergsonian images are in effect defined solely by their actions and reactions and stretch only as far as this sensory motor scheme takes them.
Perception, then, does not as idealism or realism would have it, serve pure knowledge but movement. Since images are everything, there cannot be anything more than or external to movement. It is their sensory motor scheme with its plethora of actions and reactions that gives expression to the nature of time, an open whole that is all the time chan- ging, moving, enduring. While Bergson may have missed out on the revolutionary potential of cinema, Gertrude Stein did not.
Of course, when she characterized the twentieth century as the age of cinema and series production, she was largely giving voice to what was in the early twentieth-century air.
Cinema and series produc- tion, the invention of the telephone, the wireless telegraph, x-rays, the automobile, the airplane and the introduction of a standard time constituted a very tangible change in the every- day experience and conception of time and space. Scientific and philosophical inquiries into the nature of time and space, moreover, did not take place in ivory towers but could count on enormous public interest.
Nineteenth-century compositions, with their chapters in a neat successive order, stuck too close to the hum- drum course of daily living and the manageable time of com- mon sense. Neither was a twentieth-century concern.
How exactly such a continuous present comes about is not quite clear. Stein stubbornly refused to submit to the time interval that separates perception from artistic creation. Such beginning again and again has nothing to do with repetition. Just as, when a frog is hopping every single hop will be quite unique, no two persons can per- ceive — and hence express — a thing in exactly the same way.
Funnily enough the cinema has offered a solution of this thing. By a continuously moving picture of any one there is no memory of any other thing and there is that thing existing, it is in a way if you like one portrait of anything not a number of them. Writings 2, pp. Sentence after sentence, moreover, she adjusts her take on the artist. At no point, how- ever, does she present her readers with a still of Picasso at work or a clear picture of his output.
Each moment, each sentence, Stein begins again. In her early portraits listening and talking replaces the old perceptive model, which she associ- ates with looking. One whom some were certainly following was one who was completely charming. One whom some were certainly follow- ing was one who was charming. One whom some were follow- ing was one who was completely charming.
One whom some were following was one who was certainly completely charm- ing. She adds a word, leaves it out again and moves it about. Each sentence differs from the previous one and constitutes one of those successive moments she wants to track.
In each sentence the game of impulse listening and response talking is given a different outcome. Stein, you might say, is her own mobile camera. She does not stay put and watch Picasso evolve. She is rather listening and talking, mov- ing, perceiving all the time. Stein, in other words, is doing what Deleuze would have had Bergson realize the cinema was doing. Resemblances, Stein and Deleuze seem to agree, are unnecessary detours quite alien to cinema.
There is consequently also no opportunity for the viewer or reader to grasp the object once and for all. It was to me beginning to be a less detailed thing and at the same time a thing that existed so completely inside in it and it was it was so completely inside that really looking and lis- tening and talking were not a way any longer needed for me to know about this thing about movement being existing.
She is no longer on the outlook for the concrete move- ments that make up her perception of , say, Picasso. Image and Text into action. The cinematic perception she experimented with in the portraits is consequently no longer of use to her.
It moreover differs poetically from what she had written before in that it takes the time sense of her compositions in a new dir- ection. She draws on several cen- turies at once yet turns those into a panorama of presents where action, central to the portraits, is of little importance.
The less gets done the better, or so it seems. She explains: And what happened to the cin- ema? In Cinema 2 Deleuze discerns an evolution in cinema from movement-image to time-image.
In a time-image, action no longer extends into reaction. It is not that movement no longer matters, even though there is often little of it in the time- image. What happens, rather, is that the relation movement — time alters radically. In the movement-image time derives from movement: The time- image by contrast subordinates movement to time. In this pre-sensory motor realm, if you like, nothing is as yet decided and budding possible reactions proliferate. Deleuze, in other words, replaces an organic con- ception of time where virtual gives way to actual and past turns into present, with a crystal one.
In the latter, the actual and virtual, real and imaginary, past and present find themselves bound up together in a single time crystal. Where the protagon- ist of the movement-image was the actant, the time-image calls for the figure of the voyant. And what this voyant sees when he or she looks into the time crystal is time itself, time splitting itself continuously in two — into the actual image of the present which passes and the virtual image of the past which is preserved. It is again to Bergson that Deleuze owes the idea central to the time-image, viz.
As such, past and present coexist: Image and Text that the time-image knows how to make visible. In a traditional play her emotions could not keep track with the emotions on stage, but in one of her own landscapes they could: I felt that if a play was exactly like a landscape then there would be no difficulty about the emotion of the person look- ing on at the play being behind or ahead of the play because the landscape does not have to make acquaintance.
You may have to make acquaintance with it, but it does not with you, it is there and so the play being written the relation between you at any time is so exactly that that it is of no importance unless you look at it. Writings 2, p. There is no chronology of emo- tions, no Aristotelian development that forces you to keep up.
What the cinema as Stein conceived of it and photog- raphy share is their claim on empirical reality. She wanted to go beyond experience. The text itself belies any such notion on several fronts. When it comes to the acts and scenes, for example, Stein mocks an orderly sequence of chapters. Readers are fooled over and over again. Acts, repeated acts and scenes proliferate.
The opera mocks order, first and foremost the traditional temporal sequence of a five- or three-act play, which tries to dictate the audience what to feel when. Four saints were not born at one time although they knew each other.
Image and Text the other one the father. Four saints later to be if to be one to be to be one to be. Might tingle. Seasons and days of the week are as unreliable. All are out of joint and appear simultaneously: Nothing much gets done this way, yet all the more seems possible. Ever concerned with the new that she felt the twentieth century had in store, she made sure her virtual abolishing of the old temporal order reflected on her day and age, an era in which new configurations were actually coming about.
As we can expect, no answer is given with respect to the meaning of these birds. Here the visionary is pleading a different order in much less enigmatic terms. Avant- gardist to the core, she wanted to break free from the literary constraints of the nineteenth century and give shape to the new era. In order to achieve this, she allied her efforts with the cin- ema and, implicitly, with the thought of Henri Bergson. Toklas, Writings 1, p. In his Cinema books, moreover, the specificity of cinema does not hinder Deleuze from opening up to literature.
In Cinema 2 he writes: American Literary Modernism and Continental Theory This near lacuna in Stein criticism is all the more peculiar since, for their contemporaries such as Mina Loy, Mabel Dodge Luhan and Wyndham Lewis, Stein and Bergson seem to have been obvious allies.
But it has often been noted that what it gives us is not the photogramme: Although he takes the Second World War as a break, this division is not rigid. The former reduces matter to the perception we have of it and the latter makes it a thing able to produce in us perceptions yet of a different nature. By means of images, Bergson wants to forego the dissociation between existence and appearance. Images are all there is; you perceive them when your senses are opened to them and you do not when they are closed Bergson, , p.
By virtue of the cerebral interval, in effect, a being can retain from a material object and the actions issuing from it only those elements that interest him. Although they are about the same age, their take on life is very different.
In her writ- ings Stein repeatedly discards memory. Remembering, for Stein, implies you can store time somewhere and recall it when you want. Such was incompatible with her take on perception, which always takes place in the present. Bergson, by contrast, reappropriated the force of memory as constitutive of actual perception.
Rather than div- iding storylines into numerous acts and scenes, the cinema and melodrama made everything happen so quietly, so smoothly, that acts and scenes seemed of little importance. Yet the trouble with cinema, Stein found out in the s, is that it too provides you with choices already made. As we have seen, the lecture tracks a change in her thought on movement which has little to do with an evolution from inad- equate to adequate.
In Deleuzean terms, she translates movement from the level of the actual, where choices are made, to the virtual, where choice is in the making. Works Cited Bay-Cheng, S. Mama Dada: Bergson, H. Creative Evolution, trans. Mitchell New York: Dover Publications, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Andison New York: Carol Publishing, Paul and W. Palmer New York: Zone Books, Bergsonism, trans.
Habberjam New York: Where Has Gertrud e Gone? Habberjam London: Continuum, a. Galeta London: Continuum, b. What Is Philosophy? Dydo, U. Gertrude Stein: The Language that Rises: With W. Rice Evanston: Northwestern University Press, Macpherson, K. Letter, 24 June The Flowers of Friendship: Letters Written to Gertrude Stein, ed. Gallup New York: Alfred A. Knopf, , p. McCabe, S. Cinematic Modernism: Modernist Poetry and Film Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Meyer, S.
Irresistible Dictation: Stanford University Press, Murphet, J. Rainford, eds. Literature and Visual Technologies: Writing After Cinema Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, Pearson, K. Germinal Life: The Difference and Repetition of Deleuze London: Riddel, J. The Turning Word: American Literary Modernism and Continental Theory, ed.
Bauerlein Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, Rodowick, D. Duke University Press, Stein, G. How Writing Is Written. Haas Los Angeles: Black Sparrow Press, Random House, Stimpson and H. Chessman, Library of America New York: Library Classics of the United States, Cited as Writings 1. Library of America New York: Cited as Writings 2.
Writings 1, pp. Arnold Ira Davidson ed. Intersecting Lives New York: Columbia University Press, Forget Vitalism: Foucault and Lebensphilosophie. John S. Ransom - - Philosophy and Social Criticism 23 1: Deleuze's Conception of Desire.
Jihai Gao - - Deleuze and Guatarri Studies 7 3: A New Cartographer Discipline and Punish. Gilles Deleuze - - In Barry Smart ed. Critical Assessments. Pleasure and Transcendence of the Self: Irrera - - Philosophy and Social Criticism 36 9: De Conceptualist Wordt Kartograaf. Gilles Deleuze Over Michel Foucault. Rudi Laermans - - Krisis 6 4: Foucault Flips - - In Eugene W.
Holland, Daniel W. Stivale eds. Image and Text. Resistant and Radical Agency: Stephen Ball and the Reception of Foucault. Added to PP index Total views 33, of 2,, Recent downloads 6 months 35 14, of 2,, How can I increase my downloads? Monthly downloads.