Sesha's Bookstore: Advaita Vedanta PDF download - Paper books Electronic books (PDF/EPUB) ecommerce, open source, shop, online shopping. The Upanishads,1 the source of Vedanta,2 say that before this creation was, the self . The words Advaita Vedanta, like the word Hinduism,7 are a misnomer. The following essay is a brief summary of Advaita Vedanta, one of the main The central position of the Advaita Vedanta tradition is that in reality there is no.
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The present conceptual study attempts to present the concept of happiness from the perspective of Advaita Vedanta (non-dualism), a sub-school of the Hindu philosophy based on Upanishads (scriptures) which are the concluding portions of the Vedas (revealed texts). Refusing to rely. Advaita Vedanta is the dominant and most well-known school of Indian philosophy. In Before taking up a study of the basic principles of Advaita Vedanta it is. Advaita Vedanta for the Absolute Beginner The following introduction is written for an 'absolute beginner' to Advaita Vedanta. Often students in the past have.
Two truths doctrine Other than Brahman, everything else, including the Shankara uses sublation as the criterion to postulate an universe, material objects and individuals, are everontological hierarchy of three levels: Zaehner, R. S an eternal portion of myself in individualized form. Consequently, an insurmountable onto- Advaita Vediinta and typologies of multiplicity and unity I logical discontinuity is placed between the being of God and the being of the universe and the being of the self. It will be useful to examine each of these in turn.
However, because of a mysterious principle called maya we human beings who are entrapped in its coils mistakenly think that the eternal Brahman has become transformed into this world of change, decay, and transformation.
This mistake is indeed our ignorance avidya , which keeps us bound to the circle of repeated reincarnations, till we gain spiritual insight vidya into our real identity, namely, that we are non-dual Advaita with Brahman. Take a lump of clay and fashion it into five different pots: Now ask yourself this question: The next question is this: Therefore, if these clay objects were to be broken down to their rudiments, all we would get is clay.
Thus, the term advaita a-dvaita denies that the clay pots are essentially different from or essentially other to the clay. Clay pots Real- ly are clay. A rolled-out carpet Real-ly is the same carpet when it lies unpacked in the basement. What drops of water Real-ly are is water.
Rainbows Real-ly are water drops, which Really are water. What gold necklaces Real-ly are is gold. Tiny droplets on a wavelet Real-ly are wavelets, which Real-ly are waves, which Real-ly are the ocean, which Real-ly is water. While it might be touchingly romantic — or, depending on your sensitivities, intolerably cheesy — to say that you are non-dual advaita with your partner — Samkara uses Advaita, as we have seen, in a carefully defined technical sense.
After all, partners have lives that are also independent of each other, and you do not usually die if your partner goes away. Just as a green pot would endure as a pot if it were repainted as blue, but would dissolve at a trice if the clay, with which it is Advaita, were to be demolished, likewise the world would vanish at once if its underlying support, Brahman, with which it is Advaita, were to be removed.
Answer 2 After you have finished reading a book of, say, pages, you might ask yourself what you have accomplished. Have you finished reading i pages, or ii a book?
As I say, usually. With Samkara, however, this is the heart of the matter. We still have to answer the why in this question: I open my eyes and I see five books on my table. Samkara would respond to this protest with Def 1 and Def 2: Answer 3 Samkara is an exegete-theologian who developed his understanding of the human individual through his readings of the Upanisads. According to him, the Upanisadic statements point towards, but do not because cannot describe, Brahman which not who is utterly beyond all descriptions whatsoever.
However, we will not engage with this issue here. The best we can do is to use a string of negative disclaimers: Brahman is not this, not that, and so on. Here is where we may take issue with the term 'monism' as applied to Sankara's nondualism. Monism is, I suggest, a false resolution of the dualism that Advaita Vedanta is concerned with. To see this as clearly as possible we may discuss the dualities Sailkara is concerned with in terms of three primary dualities.
I have called them three primary dualities because they arise out of a threefold division of Reality into brahman, jagat, and iitman-God, universe, and Self. They are: These dualities do not fall easily into any of the categories discussed above. This is partly because each pair is experienced differently and partly because as a class they may be thought of in quite different ways.
In general, however, three different ways of conceiving these pairs may be distinguished: It will be useful to examine each of these in turn. Attempts to define beings or entities 'in themselves,' without accounting for their relations with other beings or entities, or the notion of individualism found in certain I Joseph Milne kinds of existentialism in which essence is held to be self-created, are examples.
But notions of the radical transcendence of God, which deny any ontological relation between God and creation, or between God and the soul-God as 'wholly other' -also fall into this class of dualism. Also, the doctrine of iirambha-viida, which holds that the universe is a new creation not contained in its cause, is dualistic in this sense and is refuted by Sailkara in his Brahma Sii. The assumption underlying such a conception shows itself to be extremely radical once it is considered closely.
It attributes absolute autonomy or self- determination to every entity or being, regarding it as originating and termi- nating in and for itself. This implies an absolute non-relation between all entities or beings. Such an absolute non-relation would even exclude, logically speaking, any ontological or epistemological relations between all things. Even to speak of each possessing 'being' or 'existence' would not strictly be possible since some nominalist explanation of the apparent common properties of being or existence would be required to justify absolute non-relation.
Although such monadism seems wholly implausible, it represents, at least conceptually, the most radical form of dualism in the sense that Advaita Vedanta conceives dualism-a duality of separately originating and wholly independent realities. If it is implausible to conceive every being or entity as self-originating and self-determining, then a theory of commonly derived being may be posited. There are two such theories of causal- ity, the materialist and the theistic. Materialism posits primal matter as the common substance and cause of all things, while theistic causation posits that the world and the self are created by God.
According to Advaita Vedanta, the notion of cause and effect belongs strictly to the empirical world or miiyii, even though brahman is held to be both the material and efficient cause of creation. It is a model of the relations between created things, where everything affects everything else. In the empirical world, however, what is a cause in one relation is an effect in another. No object or entity can be found that is solely a cause, nor can any object or entity be found that is solely an effect Thus, causality is a relativistic notion.
It turns out either to be circular or else an infinite regress. Also, it posits the existence of brahman only by inference, while, according to Sailk: To posit God as first cause, so as to break the inflnite regress of causality, may solve the problem in one sense, but it reduces every being to the status of an effect.
Consequently, an insurmountable onto- Advaita Vediinta and typologies of multiplicity and unity I logical discontinuity is placed between the being of God and the being of the universe and the being of the self. If it is said that the world and the self 'have' being, or in some sense 'participate' in being, then being itself becomes dual.
What type of entity 'has' being if the entity itself is not being? Or what type of entity 'participates' in being if it is itself not being? It is clear that to attribute Primal Being to God as first cause and some kind of derived being to the world and to the self reduces Being itself to an attribute of some kind, even though an uncreated attribute of God and a created attribute among created things.
At the opposite pole to monadism, co-relativism conceives that all entities and beings exist only by mutual relation to one another. Nothing exists in or by itself as such, but only over against and by virtue of everything else. For example, 'I' can be posited only in relation to 'Thou. The 'I' is a 'Thou' to another, 'This' is a 'That' to another. Therefore everything is what it is only by virtue of the perspective from which it is known or the context or relation in which it appears.
All things exist only by virtue of these ever mobile perspectives and contexts. To put this in other terms, everything is simply the expression of conditions and is devoid of any real existence in itself. There are no entities or beings, only relations. This conception of reality finds implicit expression in various forms of relativism and deconstruction theory.
According to Advaita Vedanta the possibility of interpreting reality in these diverse ways arises out of the fundamentally paradoxical nature of miiyii itself: This miiyii is without the characteristics of Reality or unreality, without beginning and dependent on the Reality that is the Supreme Self. Since it is neither real nor unreal it cannot be comprehended: All people admit in their experience existence of miiyii.
From the logical point of view miiyii is inexplicable. Sruti too declares it to be neither existence nor non-existence. Since the effects of miiyii are undeniably manifest, its existence cannot be denied. Being stultified by knowledge, it cannot really be said to I Joseph Milne exist. Miiyii is by nature manifold. The above types of duality render the world intelligible to high degrees and may be taken as hypotheses that make phenomenal reality explicable and calculable.
For example, many of the findings of modern Western science have been made possible upon the implicit assumption of monadism. The foundational notion of 'pure objectivity,' although now called into question, assumes that the world is composed of discrete objects observable and identi- fiable 'in themselves' independently of the subject who observes them.
So likewise has the notion of causality rendered whole areas of phenomena intelli- gible. And a form of the notion of co-relativism has found recent expression in such theories as holism, chaos, and ecology, in which reality is conceived as a total interconnected process with no individual self-determining entities or beings.
There can be no doubt that each of these views of reality produce genuine knowledge about the phenomenal world. It is only when they make a claim to absolute knowledge that they may be called into question, for they yield only relative knowledge and can be in dispute with the claims of one another.
The multiplicity of scientific theories of reality and the consequent disputes over scientific methodologies itself displays, from the nondual perspective, the elusive and multiple nature of the phenomenal world or miiyii. Advaita Vedanta does not propose to replace this field of knowledge with a better or truer version that will render the world more intelligible.
It proposes, instead, that another order of knowledge exists which transcends the paradoxical nature of all such knowledge by transcending its dualistic basis which lies in the very structure of cognizance and reason itself, upon which it is founded.
Of itself, however, such knowledge does not lead to libera- tion because it is knowledge of a secondary and relative order. It is conceptual knowledge, not knowledge as such, which is knowledge of the Self alone. Yet the relative nature of all such knowledge points towards absolute knowledge in so far as the desire for knowledge originates in the Self. It is because nondual knowledge is ultimately sought, and because the mind can intuitively discrimi- nate between relative and absolute, that all such knowledge is known to be Advaita Vedanta and typologies of multiplicity and unity I relative.
On the other hand, according to Advaita Vedanta, it is only when the nondual nature of reality is known that the ephemeral nature of mayii itself is also truly known. The teaching that the empirical world is unreal does not mean that it is not there, only that it is like a drama in which the actors are real actors but they are not the characters whom they play, in which all sorts of events take place but which do not really happen.
For the actors to play their parts convincingly they need great knowledge of the art of drama, yet for this knowledge to work effec- tively the actors must always know that they only play roles.
Thus a drama, by analogy with mayii, is both real and unreal at once.
Yet this knowledge of its illusory nature neither impedes the play nor makes its performance pointless. But it preserves both the actors and the audience from projecting the notion of absolute reality upon whatever appears or befalls. Here is where we need to tread rather cautiously. There are many descriptions of nonduality we might cite from the Vedantic literature as the analogy of the 'wave' and the 'ocean,' for instance but, as with the notion of duality, these are easily, and commonly are, misunderstood.
We cannot leap, as it were, immediately from duality to nonduality. Any ill-considered leap from duality to nonduality is likely to misconceive nonduality in a number of ways and produce what may be called 'naive unities' or monisms. That is to say, either unities conceived merely as at the opposite pole to duality, or else confla- tions of dualities. The first of these leaps makes a pair of duality and non- duality, and so still belongs to the thought structure of duality.
It is because the term 'nonduality' is a negative term that it cannot easily be polarized with an opposite, as the positive term 'monism' can be. The second leap, in which one pole of a duality is conflated into the other, conceives plurality merely as the 'dispersion' of unity and so attempts to arrive at nonduality by means of an ingathering of the multiple to the one. This leap is a reduction or conflation based upon the mutually negating conception of duality,.
I propose, therefore, to examine a series of false nondualities before coming to a final discussion of what nonduality means in Advaita Vedanta. Here it will be helpful to bear in mind the distinction I have alluded to several times I Joseph Milne between nonduality and monism. Recalling our three primary dualities, we discover that in attempting to resolve their polarities we are liable, through a false move of reduction, to conflate each of them into six possible naive monisms.
These are each worth considering since, in their most radical forms, they produce six views or paradigms of reality, some of which are articulated in received philosophical systems.
Those suggested here, such as materialism, essentialism, and so forth, present themselves in extreme or radical forms and obviously each of them imply quite different conceptions of God, the universe, and the Self. More seriously, for our purposes, they also produce several monisms with which Advaita Vedanta has often been incorrectly identified.
The six false reductions or monisms that emerge from the three primary dualities may be summarized as follows: Reduction of Universe into God Theistic idealism 2. Reduction of God into Universe Pantheism 3. Reduction of God into Self Radical existentialism 4. Reduction of Self into God Radical essentialism 5. Reduction of Self into Universe Materialism 6.
Reduction of Universe into Self Solipsism By 'reduction' I mean here a conflation or subsumation of one pole of a duality into the other, and thereby an elimination of the pole that has been conflated into the other, which now alone stands for the 'real. It may be called a naive monism because the problem of duality has been overcome through a false unification, a unification in which the identity of one pole of a duality has been relativized and surrendered into the identity of the other, which is taken as an absolute or true identity.
Dualism has not been authentically overcome but simply short- circuited, discounted, or leapt over. Yet it is not difficult to understand how these naive monisms can arise, although reflection upon their implications immediately brings them into ques- tion. If it is assumed that reality is in some fundamental sense one or unified, as Advaita Vedanta says it is, then there is an obvious temptation to locate within it some unifying element or principle, some universal factor, to which every- thing may be reduced.
Materialism is perhaps the most obvious instance of such a reduction. If every entity, every process, or every disposition of things always involves a material quantity, conjunction, or action, then matter itself may be taken as the primal reality and the key with which all things may be made explicable. So runs the thought underlying much scientific theorizing. Such a Advaita Vedanta and typologies of multiplicity and unity I predisposition of thought is tempted to discount or bracket out whatever does not fit this view, or else to say that it will eventually be incorporated through the advance of science.
The various names I have given to some of these monisms, such as Theistic idealism, Materialism, Radical essentialism, and so forth, may strike us as curious at ftrst glance. They are offered only as approximations, but deliberately given in extreme forms. Yet a little consideration of each one throws an interest- ing light upon them, and it is particularly illuminating to consider each position as a monism.
Pantheism, for example, is obviously an identification of God with the universe. As a monism it suggests a particular type of pantheism, of course. But it is significant here because Advaita Vedanta is occasionally called a form of pantheism, and this shows one way in which nondualism can be, and has been, misinterpreted as a type of monism.
Again, the reduction of the Self into God, from an essentialist perspective, produces a certain type of essential- ism. And likewise with each reduction. Each monism conceives of God, the universe, or the Self quite differently. Other per- mutations are possible but the three principal ones are the most significant here since they represent genuine opposites as well as genuinely irreconcilable schools of thought.
But, again, they are significant because Salikara could be taken to be a 'radical essentialist' or a 'theistic idealist,' as well as a pantheist as we have noted already. It is the danger of misconceiving nondualism in terms of these kinds of monisms that opens the way to false or inadequate comparisons between Advaita Vedanta and other philosophical or religious positions, particularly with 'types' or 'typologies' of mysticism.
The fact that one interpreter sees Advaita as 'non- theistic' while another sees it as 'theistic idealism,' or one as 'pantheistic' and another as subjective 'essentialism' shows us, at the very least, that all these terms are inadequate ways of classifying Advaita.
How then may we approach a more adequate way of elucidating, without reduction or distortion, the genuine purport of Satikara' s nondualism-and with- out, of course, assuming that Sankara has not himself adequately elucidated it? The best approach, which is the one we have followed so far in our discussion, would seem to be to tackle the misunderstandings that are common or most likely to occur. This implies a negative approach rather than a positive one.
But I Joseph Milne it is those attempts at translating Sailkara's thought into positive language that have generally led to misunderstandings. This approach, from which arises the term 'monism,' has tended to leave aside, as we noted at the beginning, the real problem that Sailkara is addressing, which is that of nescience or ignorance of the true nature of reality.
Tiris in turn tends to pass over the experiential dimen- sion that lies at the heart of his teaching. From the perspective of the tradition to which Sailkara belongs, his teachings are those of a fully enlightened man. Tiris means that, far from being a philosophical system of the speculative kind to which the West has grown accustomed over the last three hundred years or so, Satikara is attempting to communicate, with the aid of the scriptures and all the philosophical tools at his disposal, his own direct experience of ultimate Reality, disciplined by the authority of the Vedas.
Seen from this perspective, Satikara is trying to expose to our view the obstructions to that direct experience of ultimate Reality. These obstructions lie, he says repeatedly, not in our rational powers of apprehending the phenomenal world, but in the conditioned underlying sense of personal selfhood.
The problem lies in the realm of subjec- tivity rather than in the reasoning powers or in the nature of the phenomenal world. The way human selfhood is experienced determines the way the world is experienced, and the way the world is experienced reinforces in the state of ignorance the way the self is experienced.
It is a perpetual circle. According to Sailkara that circle can only be broken by exposing to view the false structure of the sense of personal selfhood. It is perhaps a universal question of all philosophy, returning in different ways in each age.
Until recently the West has confined itself pre- dominantly to only one side of the question, to the epistemological problem of true knowledge of the object, or the 'objective world. Thus the word 'subjectivity' has taken on pejorative connotations.
The subject, Advaita Vediinta and typologies of multiplicity and unity I it is believed, needs to be removed from perception because it colors objective perception with its personal idiosyncrasies, predispositions, and conditioning.
Consequently it is held that ideal perception is objective perception-perception free from any blemish of subjectivity. The fact that philosophers, Immanuel Kant for instance, have demonstrated that perception of the phenomenal world including thought is by nature a structuring process of impressions, which therefore precludes absolutely direct knowledge of any object as it is in itself, has not altered this view in common practice.
The ideal of objective perception is still pursued, as though the only inhibiting factor to it were acquired opinion or emotional bias. What is significant in this is the consequent notion that, when it comes to the question of knowledge of the human subject, the fact of the subject being a sub- ject is set aside and every effort is made to know it as an object.
This is the case with the various schools of psychology too, which claim, rightly or wrongly, to proceed by empirical methodology. The assumption behind this view, apart from the authority vested in the notion of objective knowledge, is that human subjectivity is already known and understood, as though it were a given knowl- edge and presented no difficulties.
All attempts are doomed to fail since the very notion that objects exist is itself a projection of the mind upon sense impressions.
This is not the same thing as Kant is saying. Although he says, just as Sailkara does, that there cannot be knowledge of things in themselves because perception is a structuring process, Salikara goes further and says that there are no things in themselves to be known and that perception of discrete objects is in fact rnisperception.
It is from this stand-point that Advaita Vedanta proposes the notion of miiyii within brahman: Miiya which has this double of projection and concealment is in brahman. It limits the indivisible nature of brahman and makes It brahman appear as the world and the embodied being SaJikara Drgdriyaviveka Alas, how unfathomable, inscrutable, and variegated is this miiyii, that every creature, though in reality identical with the supreme Entity, and is instructed as such, does not grasp the fact, 'I am the supreme Self,' while even without being told, he accepts as his Self the non-selves, viz.
SaJiJcara Sailkara does not mean by miiyii that the phenomenal world is not actually present, but that its presence is an appearance only-though a 'real' appearance. Appearance is, by definition, real and unreal at once. This, however, is not an 'objective fact' about the phenomenal world in the same sense as a scientific fact claims to be.
When Sailkara states that the phenomenal world is unreal he is speaking not of the phenomenal world 'in itself but of the act of perceiving it, which arises from the notion of an independent observer looking upon an inde- pendent reality. Names and forms are like bangles and bracelets, and is like gold Sailkara Atmabodha 8.
Again, unlike Kant, he is not saying that the phenomenal world cannot be directly accessed as it really is because of the nature of the mind, but rather that it can be known directly through the realiza- tion that it is non-different to the Self.
All that is perceived, all that is heard, is brahman, and nothing else. Thus Saiikara is really speaking of the subject, or rather of the notion of an 'I' that conceives itself as a subject. This 'I' ahankara as distinct from iitman is the product of upiidhis or limiting adjuncts imposed upon the pure, limitless, and self-illuminating consciousness.
It is in this process of qualifying pure consciousness that the duality of subject and object arises. It is therefore quite wrong to say that in nondual perception the subject unites with the object.
This would be an instance of monism rather than of nonduality. For Sailkara percep- tion is dual by nature. It requires and consists of a subject and object and is therefore a product of miiyii. What Sailkara is not saying, as the Buddhists do in their doctrine of aniitman-viida, is that there is no self. On the contrary, he is saying that the Self or Iitman always remains the undeluded supreme Witness of the illusion of subject and object as well as of the removal of that illusion.
Advaita Vedanta and typologies of multiplicity and unity I This objective universe is absolutely unreal; neither is egoism a reality, for it is observed to be momentary. How can the perception, 'I know all,' be true of egoism etc. But the real 'I' is that which witnesses the ego and the rest. It exists always, even in the state of profound sleep The knower of all changes in things subject to change should necessarily be eternal and changeless.
The unreality of the gross and subtle bodies is again and again clearly observed in imagination, dream, and profound sleep Sailkara Vivekaciif! Notice here that Sailkara says it is the objective universe that is absolutely unreal. It is in the experience of reality as objective that its unreality lies. Real- ity Itself, which is brahman, cannot be known as an object by a subject. Thus, the notion of objectivity necessitates a subject.
The subject is its logical compli- ment. Therefore, the ideal of absolutely objective knowledge is self-contra- dictory from the nondual position. That is to say, the iitman knows of itself the reality of the Real and the unreality of the unreal, and so the use of the word 'witness' here does not imply a perceiver seeing anything separate from itself.
The resolution of the duality of subject and object lies, then, not in a union of subject with object-which would necessitate either a conflation of the subject into the object or of the object into the subject-but in a knowledge of the unreality of the separation of perceiver and perceived, knower and known, and so forth, through seeing the process through which the mind creates the notion of itself as a perceiver separate from the all-pervading iitman through qualifying infinite, self-luminous consciousness.
But for delusion there can be no connection of the Self-which is unattached, beyond activity, and formless-with the objective world, as in the case of blueness etc. The Jlvahood of the iitman, the Witness, which is beyond qualities and beyond activities, and which is realized within as Knowledge and Bliss Absolute-has been superimposed by the delusion of buddhi, and is not real. And because it is by nature an unreal- ity, it ceases to exist when delusion is gone Sarikaca Vivekacii4iima1J.
The negation of the duality of subject and object is, however, only one aspect of nondual knowledge. The difficulties or misconceptions that arise when trying to understand nonduality simply in tenns of the removal of dualities, which is impossible to conceive since conception is itself dualistic, can only be resolved I Joseph Milne through direct knowledge of the Self that is by nature nondual. There is an inter- esting passage in the PaflcadaSi 4.
A question is put to the teacher in the form of an objection: If the mind causes bondage by giving rise to the phenomenal world, the world could be made to disappear by controlling the mind. So only yoga needs to be practiced; what is the necessity of knowledge of brahman? This is proclaimed by the Vedanta. The duality of rsvara's creation may continue, but the nondual- ist, when convinced of its illusoriness, can nonetheless know the secondless brahman.
When all duality disappears at the time of the dissolution of the universe, the secondless iitman still remains unknown, because then, as in deep sleep, there is no teacher and no scripture, though there may be absence of duality. The world of duality created by r! Moreover, we cannot destroy the creation, so let it be. Why are you so opposed to it? What this passage seems to imply is that the mere suspension or suppression of the dualistic projection of the mind through control by practice of yoga is not sufficient for knowledge of Reality.
The knowledge of nonduality is not merely some kind of reversion of the mind to a non-distinguishing or non-cognizant state, a cessation of the projecting activity of the buddhi, as happens temporarily in deep sleep for instance, which would be a state of ignorance of duality rather than a knowledge of nondual Reality, but instead it is full knowledge of the identity of iitman and brahman. Thus SaJikara says: The cessation of that superimposition takes place through perfect knowledge, and by no other means.
Perfect knowledge, according to the! This perfect knowledge involves full discrimination between the characteristics of existence, cognizability, and attraction as they belong to brahman, there corresponding to sat, cit, and iinanda, and the way the phenomenal world appears to be endowed with these characteristics by the further imposition of the qualities of name and form. Name and form qualify the unqualified characteris- tics of brahman and make them appear to belong to the phenomenal world in Advaita Vediinta and typologies of multiplicity and unity I discrete objects.
It is significant that says that if the Self is not known when all duality disappears at the moment of dissolution of the universe, then it will remain unknown, as it is in deep sleep. This implies that true realization of the Self involves the accomplishment of realization within the creation. This in turn implies that realization involves knowledge of the true nature of the universe as brahman, and therefore a direct and continuous discrimination between the real and the unreal.
It is in this sense that the various analogies of illusion, such as the snake and the rope or the wave and the ocean, are illustrative of nondual knowledge. The universe as the 'phenomenal' world or as an 'object' of percep- tion by a subject is known as an appearance only, and so is still apprehended, but not taken to be Reality itself.
If, by abiding in perfect knowledge of the Self, the universe still appears, but now as appearance only, then whatever befalls will not affect the Self in any way. Nor will the movements of the mind or the emotions perturb the Self because there will be no attachment to them through the attribution of reality to them. This would indicate a change in the mind itself, even though the mind is part of miiyii. Thus a distinction is made in Advaita Vedanta between illusion miiyii and delusion, which is to mistake miiyii for Reality.
A question is put to touching on this prob- lem and it is worth considering his reply: The world jagat is illu- sion,' is the stock phrase of Sri Satikarachirya.
Yet others say, 'The world is reality. They refer to different stages of development and are spoken from different points of view. The aspirant abhyiisi starts with the definition, that which is real exists always; then he eliminates the world as unreal because it is changing. It cannot be real; 'not this, not this! Then, that which was originally rejected as being unreal is found to be a part of the unity.
Being absorbed in the Reality, the world also is Real. There is only being in Self-Realization, and nothing but being. Again Reality is used in a different sense and is applied loosely by some thinkers to objects. They say that the reflected adhyiisilca Reality admits of degrees which are named: The appearance is real to the man who thinks so. This phenomenon appears at a point of time and under certain circumstances. Some, however, deny even the reality of practicallife-vyiivahiirika-satya and consider it to be only projection of the mind.
According to them it is only priitibhiisika-satya, i. This implies that in realization of the Self as the same Reality as brahman the universe is known also as that same Reality, but that with the dissolution of ignorance in the mind the projection or imposition of the notion that the universe is a separate reality ceases. What has dissolved in the mind is the delusion that Reality is multiple, and with this comes the knowledge that mayii and brahman are ultimately identical piiramiirthika-satya , although there is a knowledge of the distinction between brahman and miiyii.
This suggests that, although the Self alone knows nondual Reality, the mind l. Under the direct light of the Self the mind no longer makes mistakes about reality.
What appear to be two contradictory statements by Sailkara, on the one hand, that the universe is unreal and, on the other hand, that the universe is brahman, really amount to saying the same thing but on different levels. The first statement denies the separate reality of the universe, while the second affirms its true nature. The two statements are addressed to different stages of knowledge in the subject, and therefore have a soteriological function, and so cannot be taken simply as 'objective' statements about reality itself in a scien- tific sense.
This implies, finally, that there is no real distinction between appearance of brahman as the universe sagu1Ja brahman and brahman as the eternal and unchanging Reality nirgu1J. All such distinctions, even though they have a didactic function in Advaita Vedanta, lie solely in the mind of the perceiving subject.
Notes 1. I acknowledge that there may be certain variations in this tradition over time, but I regard these variations as matters of emphasis which do not modify the core teaching of nondualism, which is here my main concem. I have therefore felt free Advaita Vedanta and typologies of multiplicity and unity I to quote from other expounders of nonduality where I feel they throw light on questions that Saitkara does not himself fully elaborate but which are nevertheless implicit in his works.
Ramal a is regarded as one of the greatest teachers of Advaita of modem India. At the age of seventeen he had a profound experience of the true nature of the Self without any guidance from a teacher and remained conscious for the rest of his life of the identity of iitmDII and brahmlln. After some years in seclusion in the holy mountain of AruJJacala, he began to receive visitors and to teach through dialogue. He advocated no single system of teaching, or any one religion, but taught from his direct experience of the Self.
Although not a follower of Sankara, he wholly accepts Sankara's teachings and refers to them on many occasions in the records of his dialogues. That that Being is one, without a second, that it is undivided, without apposition or predicate, without 'How' or fashion, these are not merely metaphysical facts but at the same time 'saving' actualities.
That the soul is eternally one with the Eternal is not a scientifically interesting statement, but is that fact upon which the salvation of the soul depends. All affirmations and arguments in proof of the absolute unity, the complete simplicity, and the perfect identity of the soul with God, all the evidence and declamation against multiplicity, separateness, division and manifoldness- however much they may sound like rational ontology-are for both of them only ultimately significant because they are 'saving' : A partial exception is the valuable study of David Loy Chapter 1 in which he classifies the various ways in which nonduality is employed in Asian philosophic and religious thought.
For an excellent study of this question, see Gersh ; for a fine collection of papers comparing Neoplatonism with Indian philosophy, see Harris For a study of the distinctions between Zoroastrian, Platonic, and Gnostic dualism, see Rudolph This he expressed in the analogy of brahman as the Self and the world as body. I exclude the 'monadology' of Gottfried Leibniz because although he conceives reality as made of independent and autonomous 'souls' that only appear to affect one another, they are all created by God and all act within a pre-established harmony which God has established.
Nevertheless, Leibniz's monadology is an example of a philosophy that denied any single unified substance as the basis of reality. See Saillcara's discussion and refutation of God as efficient cause in Brahma Siitra 2.
By co-relativism I do not mean the Buddhist conception of conditioned origination I Joseph Milne pratrtyasamutpiida which excludes the existence of brahman, although in other respects it is structurally similar but applied in a specialized sense. Little is known of VidyiiraJJ.
Some scholars hold that he was head of the Srogeri Matha from to , one of the four principal matluls founded by SaJikara. His Paiicadasr is a rich exposition of Advaita Vedanta and has come to be regarded as a classic in India. These three modes of conceiving duality have perhaps never been given detailed philosophical exposition because they are held to be self-evident truths by those who hold them. They operate in the mental structure in much the same manner as Kant's notion of time as a transcendental a priori does.
It will be noticed that the dualism attributed to Zoroastrianism and to certain forms of Gnosticism, which conceive of existence as a perpetual struggle between opposing principles of good and evil, are not included in our classification.
The fact that Advaita Vedanta does not discuss this form of dualism is because, firstly, it is not strictly an ontological dualism and, secondly, good and evil belong to a class of pairs of opposites which belong solely to mii.
The problem of duality as Advaita Vedanta conceives it is the problem of God, the universe, and the Self appearing as separate realities, while in fact they are one. The Gnostic form of dualism does not propose that the principles of good and evil have independent origination, but rather that the principle of evil, as iden- tified in matter, is a secondary and degenerate addition to a good original creation.
In this cosmology, evil is a product of a fall, not of the first creation. It has features more in common with miiyii, or of avidyii, than of the creation as Vedanta conceives it. Advaita has a very specific understanding of duality, just as it has of nonduality, which ought not to be confused with other types or other uses of the term. The duality of Advaita Vedanta is an essentially illusory duality, a duality that arises through a misperception of reality, not a cosmic duality.
The Radical existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre , for example, altogether denies the reality of God as well as a given essence of the self, which is to be created by the individual. Sartre conceives both God the creator and the self as essence as denying man ultimate freedom, which he locates in the potentiality of existence.
Thus for Sartre God is conceived as determinist and created essence as fatalist. From a monistic view- point, Sartre would confer upon man those qualities of God, such as self-determination and freedom to create, which in the West are traditionally attributes of God alone. Sartre's existentialism is, of course, only one type of existentialism.
Recent philosophers such as Edmund Husserl , Martin Heidegger , Martin Buber , and Paul Ricoeur have opened up the question of 'subjectivity' in various ways and shown that the 'givenness' or transparency of the Cartesian self is illusory. For a fuller explanation of this, see the explanatory notes of Svlimi Nilchilananda to verse 8 of his translation of Saiikara' s Atmabodha The works of Bonaventure trans.
Jose de Vinck. New Jersey: Anthony Guild Press. Buber, Martin. I and thou trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Charles Scribn- er's Sons.
Gersh, Stephen. From lamhlichus to Eriugena. Harris, R. Baine, ed. Neoplaronism and Indian thought. Heidegger, Marin. Being and time trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robin- son.
Ideas pertaining ro a pure phenomenology and to a phenomena- logical philosophy trans. Kluwer Academic Publishers. Kant, Immanuel. The critique of pure reason trans. Norman K.
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm von. The morwdology trans. Robert Latta. Loy, David. A study in comparative philosophy. New Haven: Yale University Press. Adi Shankara cept only meanings that are compatible with all characteristics and exclude meanings that are incompatible with Adi Shankara , also known as akara Bhaany.
Rambachan, for 4. The afrmations of the ruti, it is argued, need to be veried and conrmed by the knowledge gained through direct experience anubhava and the authority of the ruti, therefore, is only secondary. Anantanand Rambachan. Sengaku Mayeda concurs, adding Shankara maintained the need for objectivity in the process of gaining knowledge vastutantra , and considered subjective opinions purushatantra and injunctions in ruti codanatantra as secondary.
Shankara lived in the time of the so-called Late classical Hinduism, which lasted from till CE. Adi Shankara bibliography. Adi Shankara is most known for his systematic reviews and commentaries Bhasyas on ancient Indian texts. Adi Shankara cautioned against cherrypicking a phrase or Shankaras masterpiece of commentary is the Brahmaa verse out of context from Vedic literature, and remarked sutrabhasya literally, commentary on Brahma Sutra ,  fundamental text of the Vedanta school of Hinduism.
Shankara also authored Upadesasahasri, his most important original philosophical work. Modern era Indian scholars such as Belvalkar as well as Upadhyaya accept ve and thirty nine works respectively as authentic. Several scholars suggest that the historical fame and cultural inuence of Shankara grew centuries later, particularly during the era of Muslim invasions and consequent devastation of India.
Vidyaranya, also known as Madhava, who was the 12th Jagadguru of the ringeri arada Ptham from to , inspired the re-creation of the Hindu Vijayanagara Empire of South India in response to the devastation caused by the Islamic Delhi Sultanate.
Vidyaranya was a minister in Vijayanagara Empire and enjoyed royal support, and his sponsorship and methodical eorts helped establish Shankara as a rallying symbol of values, and helped spread historical and cultural inuence of Shankaras Vedanta philosophies. Vidyaranya also helped establish monasteries mathas to expand the cultural inuence of Shankara and Advaita Vedanta. Commentaries on Nrisimha-Purvatatapaniya and Shveshvatara Upanishads are attributed to Adi Shankara, but their authenticity is highly doubtful.
The authenticity of Shankara being the author of Vivekacmai has been questioned, but scholars generally credit it to him. Surevara and Maana Mira may be authentic. He travelled all over India to help   Vedanta. His teachings and tradition form the basis of Smartism and have inuenced Maana Mira was a Mimamsa scholar and a follower Sant Mat lineages.
Shankara ex- Mira and his wife were defeated by Shankara in a debate, plained that all deities were but dierent forms of the one where-after he became a follower of Shankara. Hiriyanna and Kuppuswami Sastra have pointed out that Some scholars doubt Shankaras early inuence in Surevara and Maana Mira had dierent views on var India. Mira, the individual jiva is the locus of avidya, while the study of the Vedas and reection are additional whereas Suresvara contents that avidya regarding factors.
Vivarana Liberation: Only the direct realiza- Vivarana, a commentary on the Pancapadika by tion of Brahma is liberating, which can only be at- Padmapadacharya. According to Roodurmum, his this knowledge is directly liberating, while medita- line of thought [ After Shankaras death several subschools developed.
Two of them still exist today, the Bhmat and the Vivarana. The Vivarana-school takes an epistemological approach. Prakasatman was the rst to propound the theory of mulavidya or maya as being of positive beginningless nature, and sees Brahman as the source of avidya.
Critics object that Brahman is pure consciousness, so it can't be the source of avidya. Another problem is that contradictory qualities, namely knowledge and ignorance, are attributed to Brahman.
These schools worked out the logical implications of various Advaita doctrines. Two of the problems they encountered were the further interpretations to the concepts of 4. According to Sangeetha Menon, prominent names in the Vachaspati Misra c. Only two nandagiri, Amalnand thirteenth century , works are known of Vachaspati Misra, the Brahmatattvasamiksa on Maana Miras Brahma-siddhi, and his Vidyraya, akarnand fourteenth century , Bhamati on the Sankara-bhasya, Shankaras com Sadnand fteenth century , mentary on the Brahma-sutras.
Praknanda, Nsihrama sixteenth century , The Bhamati-school takes an ontological approach. Candraekhara Bhrati, Chandrasekharendra Saraswati Swamigal, Sacchidnandendra Saraswati Monks of these ten orders dier in part in their beliefs and practices, and a section of them is not considered twentieth century. While the dasanmis associated with the Sankara maths Contemporary teachers are the orthodox Jagadguru of follow the procedures enumerated by Adi ankara, some Sringeri Sharada Peetham; the more traditional teachers of these orders remained partly or fully independent in Sivananda Saraswati , Chinmayananda their belief and practices; and outside the ocial control Saraswati,[web 13] and Dayananda Saraswati Arsha of the Sankara maths.
Vidya ;[web 13] and less traditional teachers like Narayana The advaita sampradaya is not a Saiva sect,[web 14] Guru. Dashanami Sampradaya According to Nakamura, these mathas contributed to the Advaita Vedanta is, at least in the west, primarily known inuence of Shankara, which was due to institutional factors.
Smarta Tradition as a philosophical system. But it is also a tradition of renunciation. Philosophy and renunciation are closely Traditionally, Shankara is regarded as the greatest related: Thus one could worship any one of ve deities Vishnu, Siva, Durga, Adi Sankara is said to have organised the Hindu monks of Surya, Ganesa as ones istadevata deity of these ten sects or names under four Mahas Sanskrit: With the onset of the British Raj, the colonialisation of India by the British, there also started a Hindu renaissance in the 19th century, which profoundly changed the understanding of Hinduism in both India and the west.
The tendency of a blurring of philosophical distinctions has also been noted by Burley. Vedanta came to be regarded as the essence of Hinduism, and Advaita Vedanta came to be regarded as then paradigmatic example of the mystical nature of the Hindu religion. Within these doxologies, Advaita Vedanta was given the highest position, since it was regarded to be most inclusive system. Hes been a prime inuence on 19th century Hindu modernists like Vivekananda, who also tried to integrate various strands of Hindu thought, taking Advaita Vedanta as its most representative specimen.
In modern times, states King, Advaita Vedanta has acquired a broad acceptance in Indian culture and beyond as the paradigmatic example of Hindu spirituality. A major proponent in the popularisation of this Universalist and Perennialist interpretation of Advaita Vedanta was Vivekananda, who played a major role in the revival of Hinduism, and the spread of Advaita Vedanta to the west via the Ramakrishna Mission.
His interpretation of Advaita Vedanta has been called NeoVedanta. Advaita Vedanta came to occupy a central position in the classication of various Hindu traditions. With the onset of Islamic rule, hierarchical classications of the various orthodox schools were developed to shield Hindu Philosophy from Islamic inuences. Scholars are divided on the historical inuence of Advaita Vedanta. Some Indologists state that it is one of the most studied Hindu philosophy and the most inuential schools of classical Indian thought.
Neo-Advaita of other religions. Vivekananda also claimed that Advaita is the only religion that is in agreement with modern science. In a talk on The absolute and manifestation given in at London in Swami Vivekananda said, I may make bold to say that the only religion which agrees with, and even goes a little further than modern researchers, both on physical and moral lines is the Advaita, and that is why it appeals to modern scientists so much.
They nd that the old dualistic theories are not enough for them, do not satisfy their necessities. A man must have not only faith, but intellectual faith too. Without calling into question the right of any philosopher to interpret Advaita according to his own understanding of it, The basic correlation of renunciation and Bliss has been lost sight of in the attempts to underscore the cognitive structure and the realistic structure which according to Samkaracarya should both belong to, and indeed constitute the realm of my.
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan further popularized Advaita Vedanta, presenting it as the essence of Hinduism.
According to Radhakrishnan, maya is not a strict absolute idealism, but a subjective misperception of the world as ultimately real. Nondualism Advaita Vedanta has gained attention in western spirituality and New Age, where various traditions are seen as driven by the same non-dual experience. Vishishtadvaita Ramanujas Vishishtadvaita school and Shankara's Advaita school are both nondualism Vedanta schools, both are premised on the assumption that all souls can hope for and achieve the state of blissful liberation; in contrast, Madhvacharya and his Dvaita subschool of Vedanta believed that some souls are eternally doomed and damned.
Shuddhadvaita Vallabhacharya CE , the proponent of the philosophy of Shuddhadvaita Brahmvad enunciates that Ishvara has created the world without connection with any external agency such as Maya which itself is his power and manifests Himself through the world. Brahman or Ishvara desired to become many, and he became the multitude of individual souls and the world.
Vallabha recognises Brahmn as the whole and the individual as a part but devoid of bliss. According to B. Sharma, the early commentators on the Brahma Sutras were all realists, or pantheist realists. The Absolute is aja, the unborn eternal. Madhvacharya was also a critic of Advaita Vedanta. Advaitas nondualism asserted that Atman soul and Brahman are identical, there is interconnected oneness of all souls and Brahman, and there are no pluralities Madhva in contrast asserted that Atman soul and Brahman are dierent, only Vishnu is the Lord Brahman , individual souls are also dierent and depend on Vishnu, and there are pluralities.
Advaita Vedanta and various other schools of Hindu philosophy share numerous terminology and doctrines with Buddhism. Probably because of these similarities, writes Natalia Isaeva, even such an astute Buddhologist as Rozenberg was of the opinion that a precise dieren-. In contrast to Advaita which describes knowing ones own soul as identical with Brahman as the path to nirvana, in its soteriological themes, Buddhism has dened nirvana as that blissful state when a person realizes that he or she has no self, no soul.
Gaudapada, in his Karikas text, uses the leading concepts and wording of Mahayana Buddhist school but, states John Plott, he reformulated them to the Upanishadic themes. The epistemological foundations of Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta are dierent. Buddhism accepts two valid means to reliable and correct knowledge perception and inference, while Advaita Vedanta accepts six described elsewhere in this article.
But if we try to think our way back into minds of philosophers In any event a close relationship between whose works we read, there is a very real dierence bethe Mahayana schools and Vedanta did exist tween the antagonists. The batim. However, Comans adds there is a fundamental monastic practices and monk tradition in Advaita are sim- dierence between Buddhist thought and that of Gaudailar to those found in Buddhism.
Gaudapadas Ajativada is an outcome of Soul or self, Atman is a self evident truth. Bud- reasoning applied to an unchanging nondual reality acdhism, in contrast, holds the premise, Atman does not cording to which there exists a Reality sat that is unexist, and An-atman or Anatta, non-self  is self born aja " that has essential nature svabhava and this evident.
Buddhists reject the concept and all doctrines associated. The doctrine of unreality of the world, and the theory of nonrecognition are found to be common as between the idealistic schools of Buddhism and Advaita.
Most critics believe that these are not Upanishadic doctrines, and so, their conclusion is that Advaita must have borrowed them from the Mahayana schools.
And the earliest teacher who eected this borrowing, in their view, is Gaudapada. John Plott, Global History of Philosophy, . Mahadevan suggests that Gaudapada adopted Buddhist terminology and borrowed its doctrines to his Vedantic goals, much like early Buddhism adopted Upanishadic terminology and borrowed its doctrines to Buddhist goals; both used pre-existing concepts and ideas to convey new meanings.
Perennial philosophy Isaeva states in her analysis of scholarly views, that these have historically and in modern times ranged from Advaita and Buddhism are very dierent, to Advaita and Buddhism absolutely coincide in their main tenets, to after purifying Buddhism and Advaita of accidental or historically conditioned accretions, both systems can be safely regarded as an expression of one and the same eternal absolute truth.
It was strongly inuenced by Buddhist Madhyamaka and Yogacara, and it further developed to its ultimate extreme monistic ideas already present in the Upanishads.
It is, states Milne, misleading to call Advaita Vedanta monistic, since this confuses the negation of difference with conation into one. Any philosophy worthy of its title should not be a mere intellectual exercise but should have practical application in enabling man to live an enlightened life.
A philosophy which makes no dierence to the quality and style of our life is no philosophy, but an empty intellectual construction. The buck stops here. The unchanging, innite, immanent, and transcendent reality which is all matter, energy, time, space, being, and everything beyond in this Universe; that is the one supreme, universal spirit without a second.
Puligandla states it as the unchanging reality amidst and beyond the world, The Self-existent, the Absolute and the Imperishable. Brahman is indescribable. The principle of the world, the absolute, the general, universal, the cosmic principle, the ultimate that is the cause of everything including all gods, the knowledge, the soul, sense of self of each human being that is fearless, luminuous, exalted and blissful, the essence of liberation, of spiritual freedom, the universe within each living being and the universe outside, the essence and everything innate in all that exists inside, outside and everywhere.
Advaitins are non-sectarian, and they advocate worship of Siva and Visnu equally with that of the other deities of Hinduism, like Sakti, Ganapati and others. Nicholas F. Gandhi have been labeled neoVedantists, a philosophy that rejects the Advaitins claim that the world is illusory. Aurobindo, in his The Life Divine, declares that he has moved from Sankaras universal illusionism to his own universal realism Wobei der Begri Neo-Advaita darauf hinweist, dass sich die traditionelle Advaita von dieser Strmung zunehmend distanziert, da sie die Bedeutung der benden Vorbereitung nach wie vor als unumgnglich ansieht.
The term Neo-Advaita indicating that the traditional Advaita increasingly distances itself from this movement, as they regard preparational practicing still as inevitable   Alan Jacobs: The term is carefully selected because 'neo' means 'a new or revived form'. It can even be termed 'pseudo' because, by presenting the teaching in a highly attenuated form, it might be described as purporting to be Advaita, but not in eect actually being so, in the fullest. In this watering down of the essential truths in a palatable style made acceptable and attractive to the contemporary western mind, their teaching is misleading.
Kalupahanan sees Madhyamaka and Yogacara as reactions against developments toward substance ontology in Buddhism. The standard translation of both terms is consciousness-only or mind-only. Several modern researchers object this translation, and the accompanying label of absolute idealism or idealistic monism. Something is. It is not. It both is and is not. It neither is nor is not.
T Suzuki, anutpada is not the opposite of utpada, but transcends opposites. It is the seeing into the true nature of existence, the seeing that all objects are without self-substance. Vedantists and Buddhists have been fully aware of the gulf between their doctrines, a gulf that cannot be bridged over.
According to Majjhima Nikaya, Sutta 22, a doctrine that proclaims The same is the world and the self. This I shall be after death; imperishable, permanent, eternal! On the other side, the Katha Upanishad 2, 1, 14 does not see a way to deliverance in the Buddhist theory of dharmas impersonal processes: He who supposes a profusion of particulars gets lost like rain water on a mountain slope; the truly wise man, however, must realize that his Atman is at one with the Universal Atman, and that the former, if puried from dross, is being absorbed by the latter, just as clear water poured into clear water becomes one with it, indistinguishably.
Non-dual Kashmir Shaivism, for example, was inuenced by, and took over doctrines from, several orthodox and heterodox Indian religious and philosophical traditions. See also [web 27] and [web 28]. Kalupahana notes that the Visuddhimagga of Theravada Buddhism tradition contains some metaphysical speculations, such as those of the Sarvastivadins, the Sautrantikas, and even the Yogacarins". Gaudapadas inuential Advaita Vedanta text consists of four chapters; Chapter One, Two and Three of which are entirely Vedantin and founded on the Upanishads, with little Buddhist avor.
The Buddhist Nirvana is, therefore, not the primordial ground, the eternal essence, which is at the basis of everything and form which the whole world has arisen the Brahman of the Upanishads.
Fost , Playful Illusion: Advaita Vedanta is the most inuential philosophical system in Hindu thought. The essential philosophy of Advaita is an idealist monism, and is considered to be presented rst in the Upaniads and consolidated in the Brahma Stra by this tradition.
The prevailing monism of the Upanishads was developed by the Advaita Vedanta to its ultimate extreme. NyayaVaiseshika is realistic; Advaita Vedanta is idealistic. The former is pluralistic, the latter monistic. A Thousand Teachings: The Upadeashasr of akara. SUNY Press. ISBN The Vedanta-Sutras, Part 1, p. Max Muller, page 12 with footnote 1. AM, Rosen Publishing. ISBN , page Indian Philosophy Vol 4 Editor: World Religions.
Winona, MN: Saint Marys Press. An Introduc-  John Bowker ed. A thousand teachings: Motilal Banarsidass. Advaita and nirguni , , movements, on the other hand, stress an interior mysticism in which the devotee seeks to discover the identity  Paul Deussen, Sixty Upanishads of the Veda, Motilal Baof individual soul atman with the universal ground of narsidass, ISBN , pages , being brahman or to nd god within himself.
Atman as the innermost narsidass, ISBN , pages , , essence or soul of man, and Brahman as the innermost , essence and support of the universe. Thus we can see in the Upanishads, a tendency towards a convergence of  Venkatramaiah , p.
A Philosophical , page 63; Quote: The Philosophy of the pages 12, Upanishads. Cosimo Classics 1 June Eliot Deutsch , Advaita Vedanta: Advaita  Wilber , p. Prakarana Manjari, Translators: Routledge, , page A Problem of  B Matilal , Perception: Vidy and Avidy: Philosophy East and west.
The , pages Upadesasahasri of Sankara. An introduction to Hindu In dias contemplative psychological perspective on motivation, self, and development PDF pdf ed. A-M, Rosen Publishing. Yoga for ideal weight and shape. Sydney, Australia: N-Z, Rosen Publishing. Comans , pp. Aiyar Transl. Nikhilananda , Hinduism: Deutsch , p. Eliott Deutsche , in Philosophy of Religion: